

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_152084

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 110 B96 C . Accession No. 8432

Author Burns, C D.

Title Contact Between Minds

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below. 192

THE CONTACT BETWEEN MINDS



MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • MADRAS
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO
DALLAS • SAN FRANCISCO

THE • MACMILLAN CO OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

THE
CONTACT BETWEEN
MINDS

A METAPHYSICAL HYPOTHESIS

BY

C. DELISLE BURNS

AUTHOR OF

'POLITICAL IDEALS,' 'GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY,' ETC., ETC.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1923

COPYRIGHT

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

THE purpose of this book is very limited. It is not a theory of reality. It is an attempt to determine the character of only one element in reality, namely the relation between minds which is referred to in common speech as communication or co-operation. And even that relation is not here analysed psychologically, for the subject here is philosophy or metaphysics. To analyse the kinds of communication and discover their necessary conditions would require psychological experiment ; and although the results of some past experiments are, in fact, relevant, the presence of communication between minds has not been much noticed by psychologists. For example, whenever we test acuity of sense and refer to the " real " weight or the " real " size of objects, we are using a standard which implies communication of minds ; but that does not suffice as evidence for its psychological character. Socrates, worried by the orthodox, said he had enough religion for his needs ; and the experimental psychologist may say that he has enough metaphysics for his needs. So also may the students of the various " social " sciences—economics, politics, and the rest. They need not be concerned with the assumptions

vi THE CONTACT BETWEEN MINDS

they make in regard to communication between minds—as though it were not perfectly obvious to all men of sense that there are many minds, and that some of these do communicate ! But the philosopher cannot afford to let these assumptions slip by unnoticed. Therefore, here the attempt is made to “ place ” the fact of communication in relation to other facts in the real world ; and perhaps this may be useful even to psychologists and social theorists.

Because communication has not been exactly “ placed,” some philosophers have said, with Leibniz, that minds are not present to one another, “ monads have no windows,” and other philosophers have said, with the Hegelians, that there is only one Mind. The reason for both these theories seems to lie in a misreading of the character of communication. Again, the explanation of sense-data, of illusory objects, of scientific objects, and of “ values ” or ideals, seems to be dependent in some way upon the character of communication. The subject of this book, then, if limited, is nevertheless important. The theory here suggested, however, must be regarded as a metaphysical *hypothesis*, and, therefore, no more than a “ first vintage ” to be used by future students. Its connections with the explanation of other realities are not fully worked out ; and its fruitfulness as a hypothesis can hardly be tested without additional investigation. But as it stands it may perhaps be suggestive.

The terminology used will sufficiently indicate that some of the results obtained by Professor Alexander and Professor Whitehead are assumed to be valid.

The debt to them must, therefore, be acknowledged. I wish specially to thank Professor Alexander for having read through the proofs of this book and suggested many important corrections. A debt to other philosophers, such as Mr. Russell, Dr. Moore, and Professor Laird, is acknowledged in the references to their works made in the course of the argument.

A further debt, which will not be so generally recognised and, therefore, should be specially acknowledged, is owed to the Scholastics. The theory of subsistent relations is partly due to Aquinas, partly to Ockham ; and the theory of ideal elements is partly due to Nicholas de Cusa, who perhaps can hardly be called a Scholastic but belongs to the same tradition. It is sometimes said, even by philosophers, that Scholastic realism is too subtle ; but it is nearer the truth to say of it, what Bacon said of the syllogism, that it was not subtle enough—"subtilitati naturae longe impar." The careful determination of particular problems is at any rate not less valuable in philosophy than the modern tendency to reduce all problems to the most inclusive terms possible.

C. DELISLE BURNS.

LONDON, *January* 1923.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

	PAGE
PRELIMINARY	I
Proposition I : That all the distinguishable elements in experience, or all the factors of fact, are related : but	
Proposition II : These relations differ as much as the types of factor ; and	
Proposition III : Among these relations are some which are found in the contact between minds, which are not thereby unified.	

CHAPTER II

MINDS AND BODIES	17
Proposition IV. : That bodies do not unite minds, as bridges or tools, but that mental factors are related directly as bodily activities :	
Proposition V : That mental factors are characterised as enjoyed and not necessarily as individualised.	

CHAPTER III

OTHER MINDS	42
Proposition VI. : That other minds are not present to "a" mind as inferred from bodily evidence ;	
Proposition VII. : That other minds are present in a particular kind of <i>enjoyment</i> .	

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNICATION	62
Proposition VIII. : That minds in contact have a joint enjoyment of distinct types, corresponding to the traditional distinction of cognition, conation, and feeling.	
Proposition IX. : That within this enjoyment, the distinction of the individual minds is discovered.	

x THE CONTACT BETWEEN MINDS

CHAPTER V

	PAGE
ENJOYMENT AND EXISTENCE	79
Proposition X.: That neither knowledge nor enjoyment is identical with what is known or enjoyed.	
Proposition XI.: That enjoyment is a reverse relation of contemplation.	

CHAPTER VI

ULTIMATE VALUES	96
Proposition XII.: That in or through joint enjoyment appear "objective" realities usually called values— <i>i. e.</i> truth, goodness, and beauty—corresponding to the three types of joint enjoyment.	

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL UNITIES	115
Proposition XIII.: That society, which is the contact of minds, is not a higher or more substantial unity than its members,	
Proposition XIV.: That society is of the same type as "a" mind—being a <i>subsistent relation</i> .	
Proposition XV.: That in society, as in other instances of relatedness of the factors of fact, there is an ideal reference which connects the actual with the possible, without making either a part of a whole.	

INDEX	137
-----------------	-----

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY

It is well said that the philosopher is a spectator of all time and all existence ; for he should have reached a point of view from which it is possible to see everything which can be called real. But he need not see all these things, even if it is possible to see them ; and in any case he should not attempt to see them all at once. The selection of one reality for study may be strictly philosophical if the study of it is an attempt to explain its position in regard to anything else which may claim to be real.

Relatedness is the fundamental character of nature which tends to be omitted or underestimated in the physical sciences ; and in psychological or historical sciences also relatedness is ignored. The mind is treated in isolation ; and, even when two or more minds are said to be co-operating or to be in communication, nothing is said of the character of this kind of contact. It clearly cannot be the same as the contact of stones or triangles or even as the contact of a mind and its objects. It is this relation of one mind to the other which will be studied here, not psychologically but philosophically, by reference to the contrast between this kind of relation and certain other aspects of minds and other realities. Therefore a preliminary

review must be made of the field about to be surveyed and a short indication given of the assumptions which will be implied. This may seem to involve unproved assertions ; but clearly a complete theory of reality may be justifiably implied without proof for the sake of a detailed study of one aspect or factor of experience.

Two characteristics of mental process make it easy to mistake the character of mind : one is the so-called " transparency " of mind, the other is what is referred to as self-consciousness. Mind is transparent in regard to its objects ; that is to say, when we seek to distinguish the mental process from the object of the process, nothing is to be found but the object. We seem to " see through " the process, as when we seek to see the perfectly transparent air. This makes it possible for some to suppose and even to argue that mind does not exist but only objects, and for others to argue that objects do not exist but only mental processes. Both theories seem to be false : but the reason for the mistake is more important than the fact that there is a mistake, for the reason may be an observation of an element in reality which is not observed or whose importance is underestimated by those who assert that a mistake has been made. Therefore the element in reality, the facts or the evidence, upon which rest the conclusions of idealism or of monistic realism must be given due attention. It must be shown that this evidence has not been forgotten or falsified. The facts adduced in proof of the existence of Mind inclusive of minds, or in proof of the non-existence either of minds or objects of minds, must be stated. These facts must find a place in the hypothesis which implies that idealism or monistic realism is false : and therefore in what follows

an attempt will be made to give the greatest possible consideration to any indications in experience which may seem to tell against the hypothesis which is here to be suggested. But this will not weaken the position of those other facts upon which the hypothesis mainly rests, which are those forgotten or underestimated by idealism or uncritical monistic realism.

It is essential to the attitude here adopted for the investigation of one specific fact, the contact between minds, that the isolation for thought of this fact should not imply a disregard of the relatedness of this to all other elements or factors in reality. Too many philosophers tend to suppose that what they have forgotten has ceased to exist. Abstraction is logical forgetfulness or the art of forgetting ; and it is not misleading unless you forget that you have forgotten. But when you observe that two things are alike and then choose to consider only the likeness which is one, the two things and their duality which you have forgotten do not cease to exist ; nor have you "solved" or synthesised their distinction by failing to remember it when you are, quite justifiably, thinking of something else. It will be assumed, therefore, in what follows that both minds and their objects are real and distinct.

Again, with regard to the so-called self-consciousness, mind seems peculiar among realities in being able to double back upon itself. In this case it seems to some that knowing and being are identical. Bergson seems to believe that "intuition" (by which we know) is (identically) the living process. Croce seems to believe that all consciousness is self-consciousness. These statements seem to be false ; but the false conclusions of good philosophers are seldom without

some ground in experience ; and in the cases to which reference has been made the philosophers in question have had their eyes upon a reality. What is defective is their determination of that reality in regard to other realities. Just as there is a sense in which mind can be called transparent, and therefore some ground for supposing that either mind or its object must be unreal, so there is a ground for the various forms of identification of being and knowing. But when the contact of mind with mind is more closely studied, these grounds appear to be insufficient to bear out the traditional conclusions. It will be assumed, then, in what follows that *prima facie* in all cases being real is not identical with being known.

Certain even more fundamental assumptions, however, are made when we speak of minds in contact. First, it will be clear that we are assuming here a plurality of minds. At some stage or at one level of experience this plurality seems too obvious to need proof ; and we do not assume it for the moment as more than a working hypothesis. Even if in an Absolute or in the region of " neutral " entities there is only one Mind or there is no mind at all, in ordinary experience we act and think as if there were two or more minds. Of course, if there is not " really " more than one mind, then the contact between minds is " mere appearance " ; but that need not concern us here.

Secondly, mind is taken here to be equivalent in meaning to mental process or psychic energy in man or the " spirit " connected with a human body or " percipient event " as contrasted with the events of nature. In some senses of the elusive words self or subject, those words also are equivalent to what is

here meant by mind ; and again, mind may be called "the subjective element in experience." Perhaps the fact to which this discussion refers may be clear from the use of these different names for it ; and it should also be clear that it is a fact or that they are facts among other facts or realities or entities of many kinds. It may be said, then, that mind is assumed to be an empirical reality.

Thirdly, there is a connection between minds, as there is between all the factors of fact or all the elements of reality. The various relations of the real world are, in this sense, connections ; and minds are related to many other kinds of reality which are not mental, for example, number, likeness, quality, and the various elements or aspects of what is called "matter," such as atoms and colours. Among all the relations of minds, however, we are most concerned here with their relations to other minds, and particularly with those relations which are usually called connections or contacts in communication and co-operation.

But of all the connections in the real world the most important is that of universal and particular ; and many mistakes in regard to mind seem to have arisen from an imperfect determination of that relation. Thus most philosophers either assume or conclude that there is more than one mind. It does not concern the present argument whether the plurality of minds is regarded as a fundamental datum in experience or a discovery after a reasoning process. The point here is that in the sphere of mental process, as in other spheres, we have an example of the one and the many existing, in some way, together ; for whether you assume or conclude that there is more

than one mind, you imply that there is (*a*) this and the other particular and that there is (*b*) a ground for their classification as "minds," the universal "mentality."

Now to say that there are two or more minds does not unite the minds, except in so far as any classification implies the discovery of a unity somewhere. It is commonly supposed that the unity discovered in classification is "in" the objects classified, but that is obviously a metaphor. Enough is clear for the present argument if, when two or more minds are classified as minds, they still remain distinct somehow, although an identical reality called Mind is referred to as ground for the classification. This universal called Mind, which is what makes two minds alike, is not itself "like" the two which it relates. It is not in any sense "a" mind or "the" mind. It is not a member of the class, for it is the class: it is not the terms of the relation between the two minds, for it is the relation. It exists. It is no more dependent for its existence on being known than the two minds are. It is neither superior nor inferior to them; but it is quite distinct from them, and its distinction from them is not made but given. This is simple logic, no doubt; and, however to be explained or explained away in an Absolute, when we have not reached that point we must work with this distinction of universal and particular in regard to Mind and minds. This is not in principle different from the distinction of Man from men. A mistake nevertheless is made by some philosophers who seem to think that there is some stuff or substance called "mind." They call this "the" mind or Mind with a capital M; and, of course, there is no objection to

treating the universal in this way, for it should be differentiated from the particular. But the philosophers in question usually go on to speak of a "concrete" universal, by which may possibly be meant a universal with the characteristics of a particular *of its own class*. This, however, would imply a mistake. Every universal may be a member of a more inclusive class. Redness is one among many colours; and so it is a unit among other units of the universal "colour," but not of the universal Redness itself. So Mind (the universal) is indeed a unit in regard to "realities in time," of which another unit is "body": but Mind (the universal) cannot be a unit of the class mind, and cannot have the characteristics of "a" mind. Mind, the universal, cannot think or act or feel, just as Man cannot walk although men can.

Granted, however, that the universal Mind does not exist in the same way as this mind or the other does, there may nevertheless be some confusion as to the relation between this universal and its particulars. The classification of items depends on finding a likeness between them taken each as a particular. The likeness implies a universal; but this universal, the ground of the classification, is usually conceived as a category to be filled by specimens. The particulars are thought of as items in the box which is their class. So we tend to think of one type of reality as superior to the other, comparing the two types as separate, and using our prejudices in favour of one or the other; for some of us prefer the box and some the contents, and therefore some think the universal superior to or more real than the particular and others think the opposite. Another, similar, method of thought is to consider the universal as contained in the particular, the

qualities of the thing being, as it were, all that there is of the thing except its "thingness." There is thus again no bridge between the "thingness" and its relations or qualities. This tree which is green is thought to be a "real" tree containing, in some mysterious sense, the many universals which are the qualities and relations of the tree. Thus again the two types of reality, the universal and its particulars, are segregated.

With this metaphor goes the metaphor of possession, when we say that the tree "has" greenness or hardness or position or any other relation; for here also the separateness of the tree from what it "has" seems to be as complete as the distinction between a man and his property. Indeed the tree is by some logicians said to have "properties"; and amusing logical games are played with the "accidents" of the tree which are and are not its "properties."

Now these logical metaphors and analogies, themselves based upon analogies of a very doubtful validity, are dangerous enough when used to refer to chairs and tables; but they seem to be deadly when used to refer to minds. They are perhaps the sources of many errors as to the identity of mind and its object or the identity of one mind and another in society.

In all such explanations of the relations between particular and universal, each of these remains inactive. A box does not make its contents one, for they remain apart within it; a substance does not "have" its qualities, because other substances also "have" them. Let us then change the hypothesis. Let us suppose that the relation between universal and particular is active. Every universal is a universe,—not merely a universe of discourse, but a universe of discourse

because it is a "real" universe ; and the particulars are the factors "within" or "of" the fact which is "their" universal. The relation of universal to particular is active, then, in the same sense as that is true of the relations of factors to fact.¹ Each exists by means of the other. But to say that the universal is the universe of the particular may seem to give the universal some superiority ; and this is, no doubt, the ground for the mediaeval Realism which maintained that the particulars were less real than or were dependent upon their universal. But this would be equivalent to saying that the factors of fact were less real than or dependent upon fact, and this would be a mistake. There is no accent or emphasis or superiority to be found in the contrast between the two elements of reality, factor and fact ; for it is equally true to say that the particulars bring their universal into existence as terms do their relation. The factors of fact make fact. Appearance *is* reality. The elements of any universe are that universe in its elements. This does not *identify* particulars and their universal, nor does it make of them any so-called "concrete." They are just as distinct as they ever were, but the relation between them is perceived to be intimate and active. Let it be imagined to be like the relation between the elements of an atom, negative and positive charges, or interacting energies.² Then the universal may be said to bring forth the particular and the

¹ Cp. Whitehead, *Principle of Relativity*, especially chapters ii. and iii.

² I do not intend to imply that there is any efflux passing from one to the other. Energy is not conceived as an influence, but as a system of relations such that in an energy system the relations are different from that of merely existing together. "Nature is a system of relations and nothing more. It is, however, our practice to speak of the more fundamental relations as matter, energy, etc." (Johnstone, *Mechanism of Life*, p. 229).

particular to realise the universal. The conception will thus be more nearly that of Plato, when he uses the metaphors of participation and imitation, both of them being active relations. This activity of the universal or the particulars, however, may be the origin of an error which is the denial of the plurality of real minds ; for it may be felt that, if the universal “ makes a difference ” to the particular and *vice versa*, the real world is altogether either the one or the other and cannot be both. It will be assumed here, however, that there is a universal Mind and that there are also equally real minds.

A further preliminary note must be made in regard to the meaning of contact in the phrase contact between minds, for contact seems to be a very intimate kind of relation ; and all relations have been said by some philosophers to be intrinsic, to “ affect and pass into the being ” of their terms.

If this were assumed, it would readily follow that when two minds are in contact they are identical. And communication or co-operation would really be nothing but action by one reality made up of what were two minds. The general character of relation cannot be discussed here, but it must be noted that what has been said above about universals implies that some relations at least, and it may be all, are extrinsic. The universal is quite distinct from the particulars, and thus also the relation is quite distinct from its terms.

If the relation of A to B were the “ being ” of A, then the same A could not be related to C. It would be useless to say that the B part of A was different from the C part of A ; for the same difficulty would arise in the relation of the parts of A among them-

selves. If their relation to B and C is their "being" or part of their being, their relation to one another must be a different part.

In ordinary language the same John may be the husband of Mary and also the father of James ; and it seems to be futile to say that the marital relation makes one John and fatherhood another. When therefore we say that one mind is related to another mind, we do not mean that the relation *is* the mind. The same mind is related to many different realities in different ways ; and even when a mind enters into communication with or is affected by another mind, we need not suppose that the identity of this mind is lost, or that it is not the same mind as existed before the communication took place. A mind, therefore, remains one and not another in communication.

Two kinds of unity can be distinguished. For example, the real world or the universe or experience as a whole is one and there is *no other* ; and on the other hand, this table is not that other and I am not you, and we may say, therefore, that "I" or "this table" is one of a series of ones. The former kind of unity is not numerical ; but the second is the basis of number, even if it is not itself a number. The former kind of unity seems to emphasise "togetherness," the latter emphasises contrast : and these two kinds are closely connected with logical affirmation and negation.

In mediaeval philosophy it was said that God was one in the former sense and that, therefore, it was more correct to say "*Deus est unitas*" than to say "*Deus est unus.*" This was *unitas formalis*. But, it was said, you and I are each one in another sense of the word ; and this was clearly an attempt to express

what Whitehead calls the unity or identity of a factor within the unity or identity of fact. The unity of the factor was called *unitas materialis*. So far, then, it is clear that when we assume that there is "a" mind, we refer to the identity of a factor of fact or *unitas materialis* : but what about the other minds ?

No one seems to take Solipsism seriously. That I and my ideas are all that exist seems so ludicrous a proposition that it has never been considered except as a joke. The man in the street may be excused for applying his sense of humour anywhere, for he is generally concerned with so few realities and so superficially that it makes no difference to him to discover whether or not other men are or are not fictions of his imagination. But the philosopher cannot be excused for refusing to take any possibility seriously. He at least cannot afford to assume that any hypothesis is absurd.¹

There is a story in Captain Marryat's *Midshipman Easy* which shows how unsafe it is to assume that anything is impossible. A sailor was telling a Pasha false but not improbable tales of his adventures, and the Pasha found none of these incredible. But the sailor also said that he had seen a four-legged animal with a duck's bill and this was too much for the Pasha. He could believe much, but nothing so strange as fact. The philosopher, however, cannot refuse to recognise any claim to reality, except after discussing the evidence ; and it has been pointed out above that some have doubted the existence of mental process and others the existence of objects. But the evidence for the existence of "other" minds seems to be still

¹ It is not implied here that a philosopher should not see a joke ; but that the joke which the philosopher sees is what is usually called "common sense."

more slender than in these two cases. It is worth while, then, to conclude our preliminaries with a note upon the knowledge of all kinds of mental process, whether my own or that of others.

The data of sense are known directly. No "proof" of the existence of an object of sense-perception is possible or necessary. But there are some possible objects of sense-perception which are known indirectly, as for example the centre of the earth or the other side of the moon. Such realities are known to exist although they are not in fact objects of sense-perception. A circle, on the other hand, neither is nor could be an object of sense-perception, for the symbol we draw on paper is not the circle with which mathematics is concerned. This circle of mathematics, however, is clearly perceived, although not by the senses. As Ockham has it—"Intellectus noster non tantum cognoscit sensibilia sed etiam in particulari et intuitive cognoscit aliqua intelligibilia quae nullo modo cadunt sub sensu."¹ The reality in this case is directly or immediately perceived: and is quite unlike realities such as the atoms and electrons of science, if these are sense-objects known indirectly. That is to say, scientific objects are found by a process of inference which, as it were, leads us up to them but does not present them to us as numbers or mathematical objects are presented. "The reach of the intellect is greater than its grasp."

Now besides the data of sensation and thought, there is in existence the process of sensing or thinking. This is mind or mental process. It could not possibly be proved to exist by reference to sense data or

¹ Ockham, *Comment. in Sent.*, Prol. quaestio prima. Note that this is a direct challenge to the old phrase "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu," belief in which misled even Hume.

intellectual objects, which have contrasted characters ; and it is precisely this mental process to which Ockham refers as obviously not given in or through sense,—“Cuiusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio, tristitia et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi, quae tamen non sunt sensibilia nobis.” Therefore it is certain that mental process is known directly. That is to say, one comes up against it. No proof of its existence is necessary ; but it is not an object among objects. How, then, does it appear ? It is *enjoyed* in contemplation of objects. The mental process is, of course, the actual contemplation, cognition or conation : and this process appears in the enjoyment of it. The term is that used by Alexander and it will be used here in a similar but somewhat extended meaning.

But if I know mental process directly, all I seem to know is that there is such a reality ; for as soon as I try to discover *what* it is, it disappears. This is what is called the transparency of mind or mental process. Most men will admit that, besides the book which they see they are aware of their *seeing* the book ; but ask what the “seeing” is, in distinction from the book seen, and the answer seems to be that it is nothing at all. Introspection can discover nothing but the object “in” the mind. It certainly cannot discover the mind “in” which there is nothing. The position has been well stated by Broad :—

The real objects of introspection are cognitions, and these are complexes containing certain non-mental terms. What we become aware of by introspection is primarily the complex and always at the same time the non-mental elements in it, which are called the objects of the cognition. But we do not seem to become aware of any mental term in such complexes, nor at all distinctly of the relating relations. This does not, however,

prove that in fact cognitions do not contain a mental term nor that their relating relation is not in fact dyadic.¹

• The problem of the relation of the process to its object may be omitted here, while attention is turned upon the process itself. Whatever its relation to objects, the process itself seems to include differences or distinctions of character. Not only is seeing an object distinct from imagining one, not only is feeling an object distinct from appreciating a poem ; but there seems to be a distinction among all these processes in their connection with what is called the self or ego. It is generally admitted that some mental processes are connected with others in groups or series which each person may call "mine." The series which is mine is distinguished from that which is another's ; and there are thus two or more minds. But among the various kinds of mental process there are some which appear to be joint processes, in the sense that they are not distinguishably mine or another's.

If I pull at a rope with another man, I can feel that the pull is different from what it is when I pull alone ; but when we pull together I cannot distinguish one part or element in the pull which is mine and another part which is his. By some means I am aware of this joint pull : and it seems reasonable to say that I enjoy this joint pull, if I enjoy my pulling alone. Similarly when I put my suggestion together with another man's and we agree to a common opinion, I can be aware that the opinion is different from what it is when I form my own opinion ; but when we agree, I cannot distinguish one element in the opinion which is mine and another which is his. In this case

¹ Broad, "Character of Cognitive Acts," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1920-21 No. VI. p. 148.

also, then, if I enjoy my thinking, it may be possible to say that I enjoy our thinking together. This, however, may be only a metaphor ; and it is suggested here only as an indication of the trend of the argument. So far all that has been shown is that *some* mental process is enjoyed. It must not, however, be assumed that this implies a recognition of " my " mental process or of my self or of any subject.

Let it be agreed that cognitions, whatever they are, are given in enjoyment ; and that some cognitions at least are " my " cognitions. The evidence, however, for their being " mine " is not *the same* as the evidence for the existence of cognitions or conations ; and of course the meaning of " there is a cognition or a conation " is not at all the same as the meaning of " I think " or " I act." What, then, makes me say that " I " do this or that ? The evidence for the " I " may be just as obvious and immediate as the evidence for the process ; but in any case it must be *different* evidence. No escape can be contrived by saying that the thought thinks or the action acts, as James does in the phrase " the present thought is the only thinker." The evidence for the thinker and still more for the " I " is very obscure ; and the meaning of the words ego or self seems very indefinite. Even quite late in life the reality referred to as " I " seems to be vaguely conceived and its entry into knowledge seems to be much more like the entry of objects indirectly known than like that of objects directly presented. Its status is by no means so secure as that of mind or mental process ; and the defects of the evidence for a self should not be allowed to diminish our certainty of the presence of mental process.

CHAPTER II

MINDS AND BODIES

ALL enjoyed reality or mental process is connected in a special way with a particular kind of contemplated reality called body. But there are many bodies ; and enjoyment, being assumed or proved to be connected with each, is commonly imagined to be divided in the same way as body is divided from body. Bodies may be reasonably treated as distinct persons ; and there is no mental communication known which is not accompanied by some bodily relation ; but there are some relations between bodies which are in no sense the contact between minds. Far be it from this book, however, to attempt the dangerous crossing between body and mind, in which the good sense of so many philosophers has already perished. It is enough if the connection is surveyed from a distance, because the co-operation and communication between minds seems always to take place in and through bodies. Bodies are clearly divided ; and of bodily pleasure and pain I can hardly say that I “ enjoy ” yours. I may know the same tree as you know, but I cannot feel the same toothache. I may see the wound on my arm in the same way as you see it ; but I feel the pain of my wound in a way that you cannot. Internal sense, in this meaning of the term, is subjective or peculiar

to one mind or person ; and internal sense is very obviously a sense of a body. The object contemplated and not the enjoyment distinguishes internal sense from the sense of objects which are not human body in regard to the perceiver. Body divides, then ; but it is usually assumed that in communication body actually unites what are otherwise divided, namely one mind and another. No one denies the distinction between human bodies ; and by the distinction is usually meant that there is a discovered difference between positions in space and time “ of ” two bodies, —that is, their extension and duration, their heights and weights, their energies (in amount and kind), their sensibilities, etc. In these phrases, however, the words “ of ” and “ their ” are not clearly expressive ; for it seems to be equally possible to say (*a*) that the body is *nothing but* or is *merely* the position *plus* the energy, *plus* the sensibility, etc., and to say (*b*) that the body *is* not these but *has* these qualities or relationships. But the position of that reality which we call thinking or willing or feeling is not very different. We can say that among the other realities making up the body is this thinking ; or we can say that the body has thinking among other properties. It is irrelevant for the moment to decide which is the correct statement of fact ; for if the body *is* its so-called qualities, then the body is (among other things) psychic or mental energy ; and if the body *has* its qualities, then among the energies “ of ” the body is psychic or mental energy.

On the other hand, so different is thinking or feeling or effort (willing) from shape and size and weight, that it has been argued that they belong to or are some reality quite distinct from body. The fundamental

difference is the way in which the two kinds of reality appear or are given ; for all mental or psychic realities are enjoyed and not contemplated. The process of seeing or of thinking is not an object, nor is it " external " in the same way as a stone or a brain. There are events and series of events called mental states or activities and these belong together.¹ When they belong together in time or space or memory they are generally said to be states of one person or individual. It is generally assumed that these realities are separated by a material world of sense and that the body is a sort of bridge across the chasm which divides your enjoyed reality from mine. But if in any sense body *is* mind, then mind touches mind as body touches body. The first necessity, then, for explaining the contact between minds must be a restoration of the unity of mental and bodily activities.

Philosophers in the Middle Ages maintained that the immortality of the soul involved the resurrection of the body. Undoubtedly this argument arose from the necessity of explaining the Creed and the conclusion led to certain difficulties. Thus Aquinas found it necessary to explain in some detail the resurrection of the body of a cannibal who had lived entirely on human bodies : for at the general resurrection there might be a dispute between the soul of such a cannibal and the souls of the persons he had eaten. There would not be enough bodies to go round.² The good Friar assumes that body is edible and soul is not, in

¹ Whether they are in or of a substance is another question. McDougall's argument in *Body and Mind* seems to fail because the evidence is irrelevant for the conclusion. Analysis of psychological fact shows that there is a distinct series of mental facts, but it does not follow that there is a " separate " mind-substance.

² *Contra Gentiles*, liber iv. cap. 80, De vita aeterna.

spite of another doctrine in regard to the body and soul of Christ. The philosophers, however, phrased the premisses of their argument for the resurrection of the body not in the language of a Creed but in that of Aristotle, as they understood him. They said "*anima forma corporis*," which, as every one knows, almost means that the body is nothing but the soul. The intimacy of the connection was never disputed until the days of Descartes ; but now we seem to have inherited an unfortunate metaphysical mistake in regard to the body. We commonly assume that the human body belongs entirely to the world of mechanical "extension" in the Cartesian sense and that it does not act in the world of *res cogitantes*. Hence come difficulties which did not occur before Descartes as to the interaction or parallelism of two kinds of activity. The body thus becomes at best a tool of the mind. But here we shall attempt to show that, in some important sense, the body *is* the mind.

The theory is similar to that of Lloyd Morgan and of others who speak of body-mind or mind-body. There is a connection between the two series, the contemplated and the enjoyed, the "-ed" and the "ing" ; but it is unnecessary for the argument here to discuss parallelism and interaction. The theory of the contact between minds, however, must not be supposed to imply that enjoyed reality is an entelechy or *élan*, extraneous to the space-time world ; and for that reason among others, enjoyed reality is here said to be bodily. The word body is, indeed, ambiguous. In one sense it means a part of contemplated reality, and in another it means the space-time reference in enjoyment. The present theory implies that the body acting in regard to matter in motion *is* matter in

motion, and acting in regard to objects of thought or ends of action *is* mental, in so far of course as the body's activities *are* the body.

The psychological origin of the mistake in treating the body as a tool is probably the habit of introjection, analysed by Avenarius. This habit has released the body from its intimacy with the mind or soul ; and the rapid growth of mechanistic theories which are supposed to be inapplicable to thought processes has turned this released body into an unattached tool.

Introjection is admitted to have resulted in the mistaken hypothesis of a soul-self to which are attached the qualities and activities of what is called " inner " or mental life. But the same process of introjection has also gone to support the hypothesis that the material body is something quite distinct from the inner self. This is not often consciously stated ; but it is more misleading philosophically than the hypothesis of a soul-self. Even those who reject the introjected " self " continue to describe bodily processes as though they were instrumental. But if the body is not in any sense an instrument or tool, it will follow that the relation of " necessary " truth to contingent truth and other such relations do not imply a distinction between two different substances in two different worlds. The body then would be *res cogitans*. It would contemplate propositions of geometry and be in contact with Plato's Forms. Some activities of the body would be mental and there would be no other mental activities. This is the hypothesis which has to be explained.

As a preliminary it should be understood that what follows here is not psychology or physiology but metaphysics or logic. The evidence to show whether the body is a tool cannot be psychological, for psychology

is a science of mental data and a tool is not mental. Similar reasoning will show that, if the body is *not* a tool, physiology does not deal with it because, from the assumptions of this argument, the body would then have "mental activity" and physiology knows nothing of that. The nature of the reality of body and of mind is a problem of metaphysics, with which the psychologist and the physiologist are not often concerned. Bodily and mental activity have, indeed, been frequently considered, but generally by isolating the human being and thus analysing him. The procedure here, however, will be different, for we must look not at the body but at its activities ; and therefore at the objects of those activities. The activities of the body will be considered as affecting or having reference to certain kinds of reality or objects : and it is because of the connection of these objects among themselves that the activities affecting or having reference to them will be shown to be mental activities of the body. How we perceive or know is a psychological question ; but *what* we perceive or know is a metaphysical or logical question, and the psychologist commonly assumes that there are in the world of reality, ready to be known, certain kinds of objects. The processes studied in psychology are considered to be different from those studied in physics largely because of the character of the objects to which psychological processes refer ; and among these processes (sensation, thought, etc.) distinctions are based largely upon supposed differences between qualities, things, feelings, etc., all of which should be classified by metaphysics. If the classification adopted by psychology is misleading, the distinction between processes is probably also misleading.

The distinctions between the objects of sense-perception and intelligence are given and not made by the percipient, except perhaps in illusion ; but many different distinctions are given and it is by no means certain that the particular distinctions of which we now take most notice are the most important for philosophy. We commonly distinguish sense-data from mathematical or physical realities : but that distinction, though real, may be unimportant or, more probably, it may involve a belief in segregations which are not in fact given. Again, the relation between distinct kinds of reality may not be clearly conceived when we rest our psychology upon their distinction. For example, if I trip and fall upon you, my body certainly may weigh upon yours, as it normally weighs upon what supports it ; and the realities in this case are motion, energy, inertia, and the rest. They are held to be distinct in kind from the realities usually called perceiving, knowing, and the like. There is an intimate relation indeed between the weight of my body and the amount of pain that you and I suffer in my fall on you ; but weight and pain are held to be so distinct that they have no common element except that they both are real. So when we take our next metaphysical step and say that, not only are there in the real world motion and thought, but also substances or things or matter "in motion" and, on the other hand, "thinking things," souls or minds, we are then speaking metaphysics or classifying logically. The classification, or rather the connection between the classes of objects of knowledge, here adopted will therefore be used to indicate that it is the same body which weighs ten stones and sees red and also thinks of triangles.

The discussion will omit the more fundamental

metaphysics of what may be called the adjectival relation ; but when it is said that the activities called weight or thought are activities of a " substance " or " subject " a serious mistake may be implied. Indeed if " activity " be used as equivalent to the Aristotelian *ἐνέργεια* or the mediaeval *actus*, then it is the *highest* category, and there is no sense in asking " of what " any activity is the activity. It would therefore be better to say that the body *is* an activity rather than that it *has* an activity or that any activity is " of " the body. In any case activity is to be understood to mean a relation, such as energy or gravitation, which may be described by an equation. It is not a mysterious entity which " makes things act," but the action itself. It is, therefore, as Lloyd Morgan would say, simply " the concept under which fall certain specific modes of behaviour."

Of activities there are commonly supposed to be two important kinds : (1) motion, in regard to which it is said that " action and reaction are equal and opposite," that " nothing moves except when moved," etc., and (2) consciousness (including sensation and thought). The former class of activities are such that in the relation *both* terms are conceived to be affected ; but in the second class, called " mental," the terms which are objects or data are conceived not to be affected.¹

First, then, sensation as a mental activity must be considered. It is clearly not nerve-process. Sight gives one group of data, hearing another, and perhaps some senses (for example, touch) give data which appear to be complex or composed of distinguishable elements

¹ This, of course, assumes against some forms of idealism that there are no " psychic additions " to the object known when it becomes known.

or aspects. But what is the unity of presentation which makes us refer the data of sight to the same world as the data of hearing? It must be something in the actual seeing and hearing. The diversities of different types of sense-data include an "underlying" identity; and this identity is nothing but the reality which is dealt with in physics, geometry or mathematics. The perception of this reality is a mental activity but it is not separable from sensation. The data of sensation are not therefore bodily objects any more than they are mental objects. The scientific aspect of the world can be thought of separately and is, in that sense, a mental and not a sensible object; but the perceiving of this aspect is in the perception of the whole which is normally called sense-perception.¹

The idea that there is a *res cogitans* or mind which is not body,—which uses body, probably arises in part from an attempt to explain how we come to know *logical* sequence. There is a distinction in the nature of objects of knowledge.² Some are related by a logical nexus, such as numbers and geometrical figures; others are related as facts, such as stones and other physical objects and their qualities and also psychical states. To know necessary truths has been held to be essentially distinct from knowing contingent facts:

¹ "What is perceived is fact-sign or sign-fact, that is to say, sense-data with meaning, significance or relatedness": but meaning in this sense is not "subjective" (Laird, *Realism*, p. 24). Cf. Aveling, *Consciousness of the Universal*, p. 127 sq. The universal is perceived directly along with other data. It is not derived from them. Cf. p. 166, "Origin of Concepts."

² The word object is very misleading. It is not intended here to mean more than that which is known. But unfortunately object may mean either (a) something objective or real on its own account or (b) something over against or the opposite of something else. Hence the conclusion that there must be a subject, which would not follow from (a). Here all that is assumed is that some realities are known; not that there is a knowing "self" but that there is knowledge.

and the body, being conceived to be essentially not a *necessary* fact, is held to be unrelated to such fact except through its connection with what is not temporal or spatial. Hence perhaps Descartes' division of *res cogitantes* and *res extensae*. The division once made was found inapplicable to various sections of experience and therefore attempts began to reduce one to the other, or both to a third. But the third or only real substance of Spinoza did not really explain ; for the two opposites appeared again as attributes of God and it is not easy to see how they were related.

Hume attempts to explain all knowledge by reference to knowledge of contingents. His " explanation " is historical not logical. He thinks he explains when he points out the source or the first aspects of knowledge ; and his method has in fact proved to be the method of science, in which we have much more knowledge than the Greeks had. Plato, however, already had attempted to follow the opposite plan of referring all knowledge to the knowledge of Forms, thus, as it were, reducing the contingent to dependence upon the necessary. This was a logical method, but in the end it left the " things of sense " unexplained in that part of them in which they did *not* participate in Forms. Russell attempts to use both methods ; but not at the same time. He moves rapidly from the position of Plato to that of Hume and back again and hopes that we shall not see him moving. One cannot pretend to have caught him at it every time he has moved ; but he seems to have adopted these two different positions at different stages in his analysis of mind.

It is true, however, that in explaining mental activity in regard to the logical sequence within con-

tingent facts we must hold together the conceptions of Plato and Hume. The only possible logical solution is on the lines indicated by Plato: that is to say, the logical nexus must be the ground of explanation and the "things of sense" must be in some sense participations in that "other" world of Forms. But Hume's solution is valid against Plato, if Plato says that the things of sense are less real or are, in any sense, negligible; for then Plato, being faced by a problem, seems to say that the problem does not exist. This will do for science or common sense but not for philosophy. The point, however, of importance for our argument here is that there is no possibility of separating the perception of fact from the perception of logical sequence.¹ If in any sense the body perceives contingent fact, it also perceives necessity.

But there is another myth which seems to divide body and mind, namely the doctrine that bodily activities make a difference to what is not the body, but mental activities "make no difference" to their objects. Mind is said to be an activity which makes no difference to the objects of mind. Indeed knowledge of reality is possible only if being known leaves the reality exactly as it was when not known. That is to say, mental activity must not change the unknown reality when it becomes known; for otherwise we know reality only "as known" and therefore not the reality itself. This has driven realists to remove the

¹ The popular concept of cause seems to be a result of the attempt to render in a single terminology (1) the necessity of the logical series and (2) the continuity of the phenomenal or contingent reality; and the point of junction for these two has been found in normal bodily action. Hence cause means an "influx" of one reality into another and also (an irreconcilable contradictory) an identity of the two within which a change occurs. But the clearer analysis of the facts to which "cause" refers may show how necessity is related to contingency.

mental element as far as possible from the contents of knowledge or reality known : sometimes this mental element remains as a stowaway in the hold of the ship ; sometimes it is disguised as one of the crew or a passenger ; but logically the realist should give no place whatever to an activity which adds anything to the known object.

Hence E. B. Holt seems to conclude correctly that objects known are not objects affected in any way by anything which is not themselves. They are, he says, simply objects in a certain order. When in that order they are "in mind." In so far as they are in that "perspective" they are mental objects. But mentality then seems to mean an adjective or activity of the object ; and there is no place at all in knowledge for what most people suppose to be implied in the word consciousness. Mind, then, is not an activity at all. But can we conceive of a knowing or seeing which "makes no difference" to the objects towards which it is directed ? The activity of propositions is said to be such. One proposition generates another. The law of the series generates the members of the series. The melody generates the notes which it necessitates.¹

Against these conceptions the arguments are as follows : The "activity" of propositions or of the law of a series is a misleading analogy, not only because it is a peculiar use of the word activity, but also because the relationship which is the *logical nexus* between true propositions is not the relationship of knowledge ; for knowledge is more like the generation of one proposition from another. Now this generation is not an activity "of" the propositions.

¹ The reference is to Holt's *Concept of Consciousness*.

The law of a series is the logical nexus, but the series is not *made* by the law. The order of the notes is indeed the melody, but notes do not *make* the order.

The difficulty is this. If knowing makes no difference to the objects known, then the study of these objects will not show the character of knowing. If mind is not in any sense "in" the series or perspective as something other than a relation between the objects themselves, then the objects *not* known and the objects known differ only in regard to relations between themselves; and the study of them as known is only a study of a relation "of" objects, one to the other. This seems to mean that mind is the activity of objects of knowledge. They change relatively to one another and the new relation is "knowing." But such a hypothesis omits to note that in every series which is a knowledge series one item is a knowing body. Suppose a series 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . to be "real" events not known, and a series 1, $1\frac{1}{2}$, 2, $2\frac{1}{2}$. . . to be real events known; then the series $1\frac{1}{2}$, $2\frac{1}{2}$. . . may be regarded as a "body." The presence of the relation of halfness is, in a sense, new, and is not simply a relation of 1 to 2 and 2 to 3, etc. But of course it does not "make a difference" to the former series in the sense of making it a different series. There is, of course, a different series in existence when a body sees or knows; but the series which is known is still the same as it was before it was known. This may be what Holt means; but if so, it is impossible to say that knowing is a perspective of the objects known, for it is a perspective of *the body knowing* as well.¹

In what sense is there activity in knowing? In

¹ Note that the reality present is the body *knowing* not the body *known*.

fundamentally the same sense as there is activity in the making of boots. The knowing that two and two make four is an activity ; and the danger of saying that mental fact is a perspective of "neutral being" lies in the possible implication that the "knowing that" is identical with the "that two and two. . . ." But in what sense is such activity an activity of the body ? In the sense that the body is not a microscope or a telescope or an instrument of any kind. The adjustment of mind is the supersession of some activities of the body by other activities of the body. This adjustment is an activity : but it is conceived to be different from the adjustment of "external" existence in the making of boots. It is thought of as though changing one's position in space were fundamentally different from changing the position of objects in space. This implies a mistake. The difference is not one *within the system* in which the change takes place, but is only a difference with respect to what, for the purpose of this distinction, is outside the system changed. All adjustment is an adjustment of "external" realities ; and even the contemplation of the relation between 2 *plus* 2 and 4 is an adjustment of "externals." On the other hand, all so-called adjustment of objects is a change of "position" of the mind. The boots made differ from the boots not yet made in being visible after being not visible. And in this sense mind does make a difference : but the leather remains leather and not-leather remains not-leather.

There is a sense in which the house you do not see *because* of distance or obstacles is different from the house you do not see *because* it does not exist. But the difference is not a difference in "external" any more than it is a difference in "inner" experience,

It is usually thought to be the difference (not within either) but *between* external and inner reality. The difference, however, is one between the knowing-system of the body and the other systems of the body.¹ It is sometimes said that if the colour of the tree is the tree's colour and not mine, then the thought of the tree is the tree's thought and not mine. But in such a conclusion the distinction is not made clear between seeing and seeming. The body sees the tree and the tree seems green. Now this "seeing" or "thinking" or "willing" is of a fundamentally distinct character from seeming or being an object, whether an object of sense or a logical proposition. Mind, then, is not simply an order of neutral beings, for one of the "beings" is in no sense part of that order which is known.

Nor is mind present as a sort of passive belief-attitude, whatever that may mean. A boot, for example, is not leather in the presence of a bootmaker, but leather in which body-mind has intermingled: so a reality known is not reality in the presence of mind, but reality in which body-mind is intermingled. Of course as the boot remains leather so the reality remains reality and does not become simply "mental" when it is known. The making of an artificial object is the absorption into the body-mind system of certain elements in the real world. It is the spreading of an activity of mind or body, distinct from the activity of

¹ It will be understood that the further distinctions among living bodies and thinking bodies is not discussed here. The thinking body is mind; non-thinking body is not mind. The distinction is made between the activities of different kinds of body. Some kinds of body think; that is to say, they exist in a "dimension" (to use a spatial *metaphor*) in which non-thinking bodies do not. This follows Aristotle, *De anima*, and Aquinas, *De unitate animae*.

knowledge. A boot in so far as it is not a "natural" object is mind, not only because it is made but also because it is worn. But the mind that makes and the mind that wears it is the body. There may be no special organ of thought, as Aristotle said, nor any obvious bodily change which is thinking, as a change in the eye is "seeing"; but that is no reason for supposing that no bodily change occurs when we think of logical entities.¹

It may, then, be regarded as possible that all those activities which are commonly called "bodily" are in fact mental, for common sense will at least admit that there is a "mental aspect" in them all. But are there not some activities which are mental only? Are there not some experiences in which the body plays no part? It will be necessary now to show that there are no such mental activities; for if there were the body would be, at least in regard to them, an instrument or a tool.

A special kind of activity has regard to the so-called "mental" processes themselves. We not only see but we perceive *that* we see; or in the more dangerous traditional language there is "self-consciousness." Now in knowing that I see, I am clearly doing something which is distinct from seeing. The object is different: the activity is different.² But of course there is no doubling of the same process or awareness *in* the process; the awareness of sensation, the feeling *that* you are seeing, and activities such as pain and

¹ "The fashioning from without brings the elements into collocation which sets new internal forces free to exert their effects in turn. The higher thought-processes owe their being to causes which correspond far more to the sourings and fermentations of the dough . . . than to the manipulations by which this physical aggregate came to be compounded" (James, *Psychology*, vol. ii. p. 638).

² Note that in saying "the object is different," I do not wish to imply that in this case there is a "subject" but only that a reality is known.

pleasure are *external* to the object of those activities. The pain is felt ; the pain itself is not the feeling of the pain. There is no ground here, then, for saying that self-consciousness or enjoyment is objectless. It is said, however, that in this case at least the "esse" is "percipi," for a pain which is not felt is not a pain. And this appears to be one of the grounds for supposing that we have here an instance of what is not body. In reply, it must be said that (1) what we call a pain can work physical and mental effects when it is not felt because attention is distracted, and (2) the activity which is the being conscious of pain is later in time than the pain itself.

Even if pain exists only when it is felt, that would not prove that the feeling *is* the pain. It would only show that we have in pain, and indeed in all sensation and in all mental process, a kind of reality which is invariably accompanied by awareness. Of course you can be aware *that* you are aware, but the two awarenesses are distinct. The awareness *by* which you are aware is different from the awareness *of* which you are aware. There is no reason to suppose, then, that any mental activity is so detached or so peculiar as to be in no sense bodily.

If the word body means *only* a section of space or a certain weight or colour, then, indeed, mind is not body ; but if body is *all* the activities of that which is in part spatial and coloured, then mind, being one of these activities, is body. The point, however, is not linguistic. The philosophical advantage of treating mental activity as one among the acknowledged and obvious activities of the body is that it restores the unity of what we call a man. Philosophers have been led into many an *impasse* by assuming that mind

is not body and thus implying that "man" is mind and not body. Hence come fantastic ideas of the immortality of the soul, as if a man could be an "animula vagula, blandula, pallidula, rigida, nudula." Clearly the middle ages were correct: the "resurrection of the body" is essential to the immortality of the soul.

It may, however, be said that the unity of man would be equally obvious if we said that body was one of the activities of mind and not mind of body. This is the argument of Strong;¹ and the objection against it is rather that it is dangerous than that it is mistaken; for we may indeed give to the word "mind" a meaning which will allow us to say that mind is spatial or hard or coloured. But even if philosophers were more careful in their definition of the term "mind" than they usually are, they would still tend to forget, in the process of their explanation, the unusual sense thus given to the word. Beginning with the assumption that "mind" is a term connoting "colouredness," "hardness," etc., they tend to forget this connotation, until at last they seem to deny that colour exists at all. Colour being contained in their original datum, of course they cannot find it anywhere else; and forgetting that they have it all the time, like the spectacles on their noses, they deny that it is anywhere.

There is another reason for preferring to speak of mental activities of body rather than of bodily activities of mind. We know something about digestion and nerve-stimulation and cerebration as activities of the body; and to add "thinking" is to mark a connection with known activities. The unity thus formed pre-

¹ *Why Mind has a Body and The Origin of Consciousness.*

serves the distinction among the parts known as parts of man. This unity is, then, the "real" unity of experience. On the other hand, if we say that digestion and the rest are "mental," the body being nothing but mind, this obscures and it may indeed entirely expunge from our thought all that we actually know about bodily processes. The unity of "man" thus formed is not a unity of parts but an identity of the element in bodily processes and thinking which leads us to classify them as human; and that is dangerously like explaining the known in the terms of the unknown. And if it be said that we know "thinking" in a sense in which we do not know nerve-processes, the reply is that such knowledge is not of the same kind as scientific explanation of facts by analysis and connection with other facts. We understand better the meaning of "knowing is like digestion" than of "digestion is like knowing." In any case there is no reason to suppose that mind and body are distinct substances or that the spheres of operation of mental and bodily activity are different in essential characteristics. The chief point, however, for our present argument is that the contact of mental activities is not more difficult or strange than the contact of other activities which are usually called bodily.

Enjoyed realities or mental processes, the "-ings" as contrasted with the "-eds," are not, then, within a contemplated world in such a way that their divisions and contacts are like those of "nature." The particular series of enjoyed realities called "a" mind must not be imagined to be enclosed within an insulating contemplated body. The contact of minds, which is always in some sense bodily, must not be imagined to be the use of some alien "matter" for the transit

of enjoyment through what is not enjoyment: and, although enjoyed reality remains essentially distinct from "nature," it is not so unconnected as not to have in every phase some reference to the contemplated.

A further difficulty in explaining the contact between minds is due to the assumption that the primary data of psychology are individualistic.¹ It seems at least equally possible to say that Descartes was wrong in using either "res" or the first personal pronoun. The original *datum* is just "cogitatio" or rather *enjoyed mental process*: for there are mental or psychic states or acts in series. No one doubts that; but many have doubted the existence of a self or subject. We should begin, then, without any reference to whatever it is which *makes* the series into a series. The elements "of" the series are undeniable. There are seeing and anger and effort. These realities are given, but not as objects. They are, of course, objective in the sense that they are data, not formed by or in any way subjectivised by their peculiar manner of being given; but they are not contemplated nor held up, as it were, in the normal relation of cognition, conation or feeling, for they are these very relations.

They are sometimes confused with objects which are not objects of sense; but it should be obvious that they are quite distinct from such objects as number and natural law; for these are not, in any reasonable sense of the word, "mental." What is not physical is not necessarily mental. Two and two make four quite without the assistance of mind. But William James, for example, seems to have thought at one

¹ So Prof. James Ward says: "The chief merit of the Cartesian doctrine lies in its subjective, *i.e.* individualistic, standpoint; this has not been and is not likely to be abandoned" (*Psychological Principles*, p. 12). I suggest that it should be abandoned as a starting-point.

time that, if our certainty of mathematical truth was not due to the number of instances observed, this certainty could not be due to experience at all, but must be due to "the mind and its own fixed meanings." Thus science in James' *Psychology* is described as "flinging our *a priori* net and catching the world"—a large catch, which would certainly break such a net! "It is a very peculiar world," says James, "and plays right into logic's hands." . . . "Arithmetic and its fundamental principles are independent of our experiences or of the order of the world. The matter of arithmetic is mental matter."¹ The world is indeed a peculiar place, and truth is indeed stranger than fiction; but not quite so strange as James thought, for logic plays second fiddle. In any case numbers are not in any sense "mental matter," any more than inkpots are. But, of course, *thinking* of numbers is "mental matter," just as seeing inkpots is: and numbers no more come into existence when you think of them than inkpots do when you see them.

Now among the many mental realities there are different classes; and the members of the classes and the classes themselves are not related as objects are. The distinction between thinking and seeing is a distinction which is quite different in character from the distinction between a number and an inkpot or an inkpot and a pen. It is a distinction which is of enjoyed processes, not of contemplated objects. We normally classify in two chief ways (1) by reference to distinction between types of attitude, activity-process or relation-to-objects, and (2) by reference to what are called individuals or persons. The classification is of course based upon given distinctions in reality: and

¹ James, *Psychology*, ii. pp. 652, 654.

the connection or unity of the enjoyed processes which makes us call them "mine" or "yours" is a given fact. The problem here is the connection between those connected instances called "mine" and those connected instances called "yours" or "his." All these instances are distinguished from all other types of real in being given in "enjoyment," or at least in some way fundamentally different from the way in which objects are given. But in the traditional view the connected instances of thought and other mental activities called "mine" are given to one separate individual, subject or self in the same way as the pain of "my" wound is given to me and not to you.

Now, whether mine or yours, there is a group of realities or real experiences which are more distinct from contemplated realities than any of these is from the other. Either this psychic or mental group of realities is mind, or the experiences are the data upon which we rest our argument that there is a mind or a soul or a self. And all these are "given" in quite a different way from the way in which greenness or triangles are given. They are not, whether mine or yours, in the normal sense of the word "objects."

In one sense my thinking is like my feeling and not like your thinking, just as my arm is like my leg in being mine. But in another sense, my thinking is more like *your* thinking than it is like *my* feeling, just as my leg is more like your leg than my arm is like my leg. If we are running together, the likeness of our legs is more important than the likeness of my leg to any other part of *my* body. In the same way, it may in some cases be more important that it is conation which is occurring than that the conation is mine or yours.

In investigating the contact between minds, therefore, we must not assume that the terms of the relation are first and essentially *not* in contact and then come to be together; and on the other hand we must not assume that minds *are* essentially in contact. But we must begin with such instances of contact as can be found. We have the experience of a thinking which is so bound up with language as to seem impossible without language; but language is social. All thinking of this sort, then, includes a reference to contact between minds. Again, to recall an example already used above, when I pull at a rope by myself, I feel that it is not the same sort of pull as when I pull with some one else. This may be simply the concurrence of two non-mental forces; but if I am hoisting a sail or acting otherwise "for a purpose," then there is mental co-operation. In such co-operation a joint effort is experienced, within which it is impossible to distinguish my pull from that of another. Again, in the enthusiasm of an audience it seems that there is a joint experience of emotion within which distinct personal feelings are not distinguished. It would be arbitrary to assume that individual mental experience is not present because we do not observe it at the moment; but there is at any rate a *prima facie* case for supposing that there are mental unities formed of the experiences of different persons, similar to the unities formed by the distinct experiences of the same person at different times. And it is not necessary or logical to assume that the personal unity of experience is either given first or is logically implied in the unity of social experiences. Certainly the evidence seems to show that children feel their social unity with others long before each child develops a conception

of its own personality ; and among primitive peoples the sense of individual responsibility and individual opinion seems to be absent. Now it has been shown above that so intimate is the connection of body and mind that we may reasonably say either that body is the name of those activities of a mind which fill space, or that mind is the name of those activities of body which do *not* fill space. But the experience of enjoyed reality seems less mutual and more individualised at the bodily level. For two realities which are spatial cannot fill the same space, but two realities which are not spatial do not seem to exclude one another in the same sense. This is, of course, spatial metaphor ; but it is used to indicate the direction in which we may look for an explanation of the primitive and recurrent experience of social unity. It must be looked for outside the world of contemplated reality or "nature."

It is worthy of note that Aristotle, when he comes to discuss intellectual as contrasted with sensory or vegetative life, makes a transition from individualistic language. This led his Arabian commentators to conclude that the *νοῦς* was one in all thinking beings ; and the scholastics seem to have been uncertain whether social unity or individual unity was the substance of which thinking was an activity.¹ It is enough, however, for the present argument if it be recognised that enjoyment, and not being "mine" or "yours," is what distinguishes mind from other given realities. If, therefore, I am to say that you have a mind or that intelligence which is not mine occurs in the real world, I must know that you enjoy your thinking. That is

¹ Aquinas, *De unitate animae*, deals with this, and shows that the intellect is individual as other life is.

to say, I must have evidence that enjoyment exists which is not mine. No question as to other selves or subjects need enter into the argument at this stage; for all that is in view at the moment is the connection between a process or mental event called mine and another mental event called yours. Both are events or factors or realities which are in some sense enjoyed.

CHAPTER III

OTHER MINDS

THERE is a reality called mind or mental process or psychic energy or percipient event which is not an object among other objects contemplated. So much is generally agreed; but any further statement about that reality seems to imply assumptions which are by no means obviously valid. It has, however, been shown that this reality called mind is not alien to body and requires no bridge or tool which is essentially non-mental for its contacts, if it has any, within a mental world. The psychologists, following the working hypothesis of common sense, have generally assumed that mental process is a *datum* or is "given"; and this implies the assumption that there is some reality *to* which the process is given. Perhaps unconsciously, this other reality "to which," or the mental process itself, has been assumed to be in some sense a single unit, for which common sense supplies the name self or individual. But although the reality called mind or mental process is thus taken to be "a" mind, the psychologists and all social philosophers have assumed that there are in existence many units of this kind.

The existence of "other minds" is generally admitted to be a fact; but the logical grounds usually

given for the belief that other minds exist are quite inadequate. Unfortunately the facts of experience have been made more difficult to state by the use of the word "knowledge" in the phrase "knowledge of other minds"; and therefore it will be necessary here to avoid any implication that other minds are necessarily objects of knowledge. The problem really is the connection between minds, and this connection is not necessarily the cognitive relation.

The hypothesis which will be here maintained is that "other minds" are enjoyed in the same sense as "my own" mind is enjoyed, if Alexander's terminology may be used. Enjoyment is defined as that experience which distinguishes awareness of the mental process from awareness of an object in or through that process; and the enjoyment of other minds is to be proved to occur and to be explained in what follows. This is the conclusion. The evidence will consist, first, in the refutation of the current conceptions as to the source of the so-called knowledge of other minds and, secondly, of an analysis of the experience of contact between minds.

The word "enjoyment," however, may be misleading both because of its past associations and because the sense given to it by Alexander may be slightly different from the sense in which it is used here. The experience to which reference is here made in the use of the word is the experience of having mental process. We may be said to be aware of mental process and, in that sense, enjoyment is a kind of awareness: but it is necessary for the purpose here in view to distinguish that kind of awareness from the awareness of objects. Therefore the term enjoyment is used to indicate what is peculiar to the awareness of mental

process. It is the name, then, for what is itself, in a sense, a process : and the process or experience which is the enjoyment is thus distinguished from the process which is enjoyed. The important point is that mental process is not contemplated as objects are contemplated ; that is to say mental process cannot be an object. It does not follow, of course, that mental process must be a " subject " ; for object, in the sense of the word here used, means only that about which mental process is concerned, to which it is directed in cognition and conation. There are perhaps many realities besides mental process which are not objects in this sense, and yet are in no sense " subjective." The further point, that if we are aware of a process, the process must be an object, depends upon a theory of " givenness " which is dealt with below.

The process or experience here called enjoyment is distinguished from introspection, if introspection implies (a) awareness of mental facts, after they have occurred, as objects, and (b) awareness of what is *ex hypothesi* personal or individual. All introspection is retrospection ; but enjoyment is simultaneous with the process enjoyed, as a quality is simultaneously given with a substance or a relation with its terms. Again introspection is objectivising and requires mental skill such as is probably not possessed by animals or plants. Plants and animals have enjoyment but not introspection. Introspection, then, is a throwing over into the world of objects of the mental facts which are objects in so far as they are not at the moment being " lived " ; and indeed all objects seem to be necessarily infected with this " pastness," as is indicated by the fact that we speak of them in past participles " perceived," " seen," " heard," etc. Enjoyment, therefore,

as used here means the living through or living in a mental process ; but this does not imply *being* that process.

As for the personal or individualistic implications of introspection, these do not concern us here except in so far as enjoyment does *not*, in our sense of the term, imply any such facts. Enjoying is taken to mean living in or through *any* mental process, without regard to its being mine or yours.

Some difficulty in the understanding of the hypothesis here suggested may arise from the fact that the term "enjoy" is elsewhere used to mean simply "live" or "be," so that when I say "I enjoy seeing" I may mean only "I am seeing." To enjoy a process is, in this sense, to *be* in part that process.¹ Here, however, to enjoy is taken to mean to begin to be, in some way, *conscious*: enjoyment is not "being" but is, in some sense, "being aware." It may be said that the phrase "being aware" should be used ; but the danger in the use of that phrase, as it has been shown above, is that mental process is thereby made into a contemplated object. The whole force of the argument here depends upon the fact that "other minds" are not objects of contemplation as bodies are ; and for that reason it seems safer to say that I contemplate your body and *enjoy* your mind, since mind is by definition that which is presented or given or experienced in some way that is *not* contemplation.

Finally, it may be said that the enjoyment "of" a mental process is only an aspect or characteristic of that process. It may be that what is characteristic of the experience of seeing, hearing, thinking, anger, etc.,

¹ This seems to be implied in some of Alexander's statements, and I do not wish to commit him to my interpretation of the term.

is simply a peculiar kind of quality which these realities possess and "objects" do not possess. When, therefore, we distinguish our awarenesses of process and of objects, we may be only distinguishing one kind of reality in awareness from the other kind, and we may not be distinguishing two kinds of awareness. This conception of the experience here called enjoyment would not be irreconcilable with our hypothesis; although some further elaboration would be required to adjust our hypothesis as to "other" minds to what is implied by saying that the enjoyment belongs to the objective side of the experience of mental process. In that case awareness of realities having this aspect or characteristic is the same, whether the reality is "my" mind or "other" mind: and the knowledge of a contact with "other" mind would be an awareness of that characteristic "enjoyed" as present in an "other" mind.

In any case the fundamental point is the distinction between mental processes or minds and everything else. Enjoyment is understood here to have reference to that distinction and, from that point of view, it is quite irrelevant that my mind is distinct from other minds. Enjoyment, then, is not taken to imply necessarily a self or a subject or an individual, but only to refer to that distinction which is referred to in the scholastic terms "*in mente*" and "*in re*," which distinction was made clearer by Descartes in the contrast between "*res cogitantes*" and "*res extensae*" and still clearer by the psychological distinction in Locke between "ideas of reflection" and "ideas of sensation." The ground for the distinction is explained by the new term "enjoyment," which refers to the way in which the former of these pairs of opposites

enter into experience. Clearly experience of mental or vital processes is different from experience of objects : and the point here is that the experience of "other minds" (and perhaps of more) is *not* an experience of objects nor even derived from experience of objects. The guiding idea in the argument will be that experience of vital processes is not necessarily experience of "my" process. It will be shown that philosophers have been misled by an uncritical personalism.¹

The traditional view is as follows : "I" know that "other minds" exist by a process of reasoning based upon sense-data or perception. The process is said to be of the following kind. I observe groupings and movements of different kinds among the data of sensation and perception. The differences are the ground for classifying some objects of perception as living, others as "living mentally." It does not concern the present argument to say *what* objects are "living mentally," so long as *some* are. Animals may, for example, provide evidence of "other minds," if animals are said to have minds. The point is that the evidence is sensory. But clearly there is one mind (according to this traditional view) which, for me, is *not* given in sensory evidence : that is "my" mind ; and the most important point about "other" minds is that they are similar, not to objects given in sensory evidence, but to this reality, "my" mind, which is *not* so given.

The traditional reasoning also says *why* I conclude

¹ Not all philosophers have been thus misled, but even those who have attacked the traditional view do not seem to have gone far enough in establishing a new hypothesis. What follows here, however, is dependent in part upon Mrs. Duddington's "Our Knowledge of other Minds," *Proc. Arist. Soc.* vol. xix., 1918-19, pp. 147 *sq.*, and upon other work there quoted.

that other "minds" are similar to mine. It is because I observe sensorily the movements of "my" body, which are thus observed to be similar to the movements of some sections of sense-data which are not "my" body. I am supposed to conclude that these observed sections are accompanied by "minds" because the "my body" section is accompanied by "my mind."

Now, let the logical validity of the process be omitted from the discussion for the moment. The first criticism of this traditional view is that the supposed process of reasoning, whether valid or invalid, does not in fact occur. It is absurd to suppose that the baby, who "knows" its mother, has a perception of its own body. In fact we know that it has not. The knowledge of "other mind" is not, therefore, derived from comparison of bodily appearances of one's own body. Of course in one sense the distinction of "mother" from the rest of an environment is a distinction between objects, made by testing the reactions of the world. Some objects react only to motion of the baby's hand (*e.g.* a ball or a piece of cloth), some objects react to a cry or a look: these latter are living and among them there is a subdistinction within which is "mother."

It is not denied that, in some senses of the word, "mother" is distinguished from "not-mother" by sense-perception: but in this case the distinction has no reference to that experience which is called enjoyment, and therefore "mother" does not, so far, mean "other mind." When we say that another body has or is accompanied by an "other mind" we mean, not simply that another reality is present, but that this reality is, for itself, "enjoying" experience. Thus, in order to prove that the baby knows that its mother

is another *mind*, it would have to be shown not merely that the baby can tell that its mother is not a bottle or a spoon or another *object*, but that the baby can tell that its mother is an "enjoying experience." Babies are to the psychologist what savages are to the social philosopher, a very useful resource for finding what you want to find ; but it seems unlikely that the analysis of sense-data by babies is a discovery of other minds. And this is unlikely not because babies do not analyse but because their own bodies do not seem to enter into their analysis of sense-data at an early age.

Secondly, it seems likely that in the first beginnings of mental life enjoyment is experienced as connected with the contemplated movement of *other* bodies ; because clearly one's own body does not become a contemplated object for some time after birth. Whether the enjoyment so experienced is "my" enjoyment need not concern us here : the point is that probably enjoyment, when first distinguished from contemplation, is found to be concomitant with movements in the sense-data which are *not* "my" body. Therefore the traditional view of the ground for belief in other minds is probably a reversal of the actual process in mental development : for in fact I may believe in "my" enjoyment because I have already experienced enjoyment connected with other bodies than my own and, finding enjoyment so connected, I conclude that there is some of it connected with my body. This latter I call "my" enjoyment.

Thirdly, a very great part of "my body" I cannot perceive sensorily at all. I have not seen my eyes, or my ears, or the back of my head : and to suppose that no man knew another mind until mirrors were invented and reflection understood, is fantastic. "But there is

touch"—it may be said. Well, let us consider touch. I can indeed touch the back of my head ; but the result is a very peculiar "double" sensation at the end of my finger and also at the back of my head. I cannot have the same double sensation by touching the head of some other person. Indeed my perception of my body is altogether complex, subtle, intimate, and most strikingly different from my sensation of other bodies. The sensation of human bodies other than mine is in fact more like the sensation of stones or trees or beasts than it is like the sensation of my body. The sensory data from which I am to conclude that other minds exist because other bodies do, are either too few or too many : they are certainly not identical except in very difficult and elaborate analysis, if then. Therefore, whether they are logical grounds or not, it is unlikely that they are actually used in comparing "my" body with other bodies in order to discover other minds. The traditional view implies too complicated and continuous an analysis of sense-data.

One very grave mistake in regard to other bodies should be noticed. The adult philosopher or psychologist is aware of many human bodies in streets and shops with whom he holds no direct communication. For certain reasons he supposes these to be accompanied by minds ; but these bodies should be distinguished from those elements in real experience which are the other minds with which he communicates directly. Direct communication or contact in emotion or agreement or joint enterprise is different in character from observation of bodies. Hence, for example, the supposed persons whom we see in the street are "less real" to any imaginative man than the characters in a great play like *Hamlet*. The evidence for the

existence of mind *where there is no communication of thought, act or emotion* is quite different from the evidence found in such contact. We do perhaps often conclude that there are minds where we see bodies with which we do not communicate ; but the conclusion in this case is not based upon the same kind of evidence as the conclusion in regard to bodies with which we do communicate, and the conclusions in the two cases are probably quite different in meaning.

The other part of the conclusion in the supposed reasoning refers to my "mind," with which I am to compare what I find in other bodies. But what am I supposed to know about my mind ? Locke, Berkeley, and Hume agreed that the data of experience are of two kinds : (1) ideas or sensations and (2) ideas of reflection. The second were to be my source for knowing what may be called mental process ; and the controversy as to the subject or self need not be referred to here. The point is that there was acknowledged, even in empiricism, a reality which was not given sensorily ; and this is what is referred to as my mind or the current of my mental life. It has been assumed in the description of this section of experience that there is something about it which makes us necessarily call it "mine." But is it, in any fundamental sense, "mine" ? The process of which the philosophers speak cannot be disentangled from inherited custom, language, acts—none of which are possible to one mind alone ; and the conception of "ego" or "self" is admittedly difficult to reach and, in some forms, misleading. Hume saw this clearly enough.

Again Avenarius in the hypothesis of "introjection" suggests that my idea of what my mind is, is derived not from observation of my self but of others.

It is true that I cannot "derive" the experience of enjoyment from anywhere, but I may be supposed to obtain some evidence in regard to its character from "others." Avenarius did not conclude, as he might have done, that the experience of enjoyment is not individual or personal ; but he has at any rate shaken the traditional view that we simply transfer what we find in our own bodies to other bodies when we say that they have or are "other" minds. It seems unlikely, therefore, that we do first conclude that other minds exist because of inference from "my" mind and other people's bodies, whatever may be said of the logic of such an inference.

As for the logic in the supposed reasoning process, it does not seem justifiable to conclude that there is, apart from "my" mind, another of that type of reality which appears non-sensorily to me as mind, from evidence which is, by hypothesis, sensory and thus entirely distinct from the very evidence on which I rest my belief that "my" mind exists. So far no one has said that I believe in the existence of what I call my mental process *because* of observation of my body : but if I do not believe in what I enjoy because of the body I contemplate in my own case, why should I believe in it in the case of others for that reason ? Again "my" body is so different in experience from the body of any one else, and the likeness so slight, that it can hardly be a safe logical ground for inferring that an "other" exists which is like my enjoyment. The logic of the supposed process is induction by the method of agreement ; but the agreement seems to be very slight, at any rate in those earlier years in which obviously children act as if they believed that other minds exist. Surely the logic implied in the

traditional view is a little weak. Of course, men do in fact use bad logic ; but the traditional view implies not simply that I *do* believe but that I am right in believing that other minds exist for these reasons.

The difficulty of the whole traditional view is to be seen in its simplest form in Berkeley. He takes the objects of knowledge to be "ideas" ; but he very well shows that there is in experience a reality called "perceiving" which is not and cannot be reduced to terms of "ideas." He assumes, without noticing that it is a pure assumption, that perceiving implies *my* perceiving, and therefore continues to argue as if, not "perceiving," but "a particular spirit or self" were given in experience.¹ He then shows that "ideas" differ in kind, some of them being not amenable to "my" will or desire, as imaginations are. The non-amenable ideas are then said to lead to the conclusion that there is another spirit or "perceiving" (thing) in existence. It does not matter, for our present argument, whether there is only one "other" mind, namely God's, or many "other" minds. The important fact is that Berkeley thinks that we conclude from "ideas" that "non-ideas" other than "my" perceiving, are real. But this can be logical only if my activities could be viewed as "ideas" for some reality which is not "my" perceiving. There is no escape from solipsism, unless the source of knowledge that "perceiving" exists, which is not "mine," is not ideas. I can prove that my "ideas" are caused by something active, not myself, only if I know that my activity causes such ideas in something perceiving

¹ Berkeley, *Principles*, section 2 : "Besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them. . . . This perceiving, active being is what I call Mind, Spirit, Soul or Myself." And for the "other Spirit," cf. section 29.

which is not myself. But this I cannot know from my "ideas."

The defect of the traditional view is not due to the distinction between "perceiving" and "ideas," between enjoyment and contemplation of objects. The defect arises out of the illegitimate introduction of the distinction between "me" and "other" into the mental, experiencing or "enjoying," section of experience, as if there were no enjoyment at all which was not "my" enjoyment. We cannot, of course, assume that the "my" is *not* essential or invariable in enjoyment, but on the other hand we should not assume that it *is* essential. To assume either is to prejudice the whole explanation of how we come into contact with "other" minds. It involves either a *petitio principii* or no conclusion at all: for the preliminary question is whether there are any other minds. If what I mean by mind is "my" mind, then, of course, I can only conclude that there are "other" minds by repudiating my premises. The one distinguishing mark of mind is enjoyment; but if all enjoyment is "my" enjoyment, then there is no "other" enjoyment and other minds do not "enjoy," that is, they are not minds. The traditional view, therefore, of the way in which we come to believe that "other" minds exist, is unlikely as a description of psychological facts and implies very questionable logic.

The positive evidence in favour of a new view is as follows: first, the enjoyment of mental process or activity is not necessarily and always an enjoyment of a distinguishable "me." The specific meaning of the term enjoyment is intended to distinguish the consciousness of objects from an experience which Locke called "ideas of reflection," which, although in a sense

a consciousness, is certainly not "of objects" and may not be in any valid sense consciousness at all. Hence the use of other words such as "awareness" in regard to the peculiar type of experience which Locke called "ideas of reflection." Of course, the highly developed abstract thinker may invariably distinguish self from other selves within the manifold which is psychic life or mental energy ; but there are indications in social history that action, thought, and feeling were known to simpler minds or clearly experienced by them without reference to a distinction of "my" mind from "other" minds. For example, the early history of the concept of moral responsibility, as Hobhouse has shown, implies a recognition of communal or group sources of action and thought but no recognition of what we now call individual responsibility.¹ Hence the blood-feud and other such customs. Psychologically this seems to imply an experience in which the source of action and thought is not felt to be, in our sense of the word, individual. Individuality appears very much later. But metaphysically it may be said it was there all the time, and that need not be denied : it should, however, be recognised that a genuine and fundamental reality distinct from individual sources is felt to be present in the experience of primitive peoples or groups and that is what we call joint or common action and thought. There is a type of enjoyment of acts or of thoughts within which it is impossible to disentangle the parts as belonging to distinct persons : and possibly this type of enjoyment is more obvious among primitive groups. Again, it is generally admitted that a very young baby communicates with its mother and seems to be aware of "mental" activities ; but such a

¹ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*.

baby is generally thought to have no consciousness of its "ego." There are in childhood many indications of the gradual emergence of the sense of a self : but it is quite clear that long before this a child has a very full appreciation of joint action. Possibly no section of social philosophy could be grounded in metaphysics unless mental process or enjoyment were, fundamentally or in some sense, not "mine" and "yours" ; but if enjoyment is not "personal," then the analysis of social experience may provide data for metaphysics.

This points to the conclusion that the awareness of "other" minds is a comparatively late subdistinction, as it were, within the enjoyment of mind. The belief in other minds, then, must rest upon an analysis of the experience of enjoyment, and not upon sensory perception of objects : but the analysis is to be understood in the language of modern Realism, for the distinction between "minds," found by analysis, is real, and is not the result of the analysis. The point is that "other" minds are found within the sphere of "enjoyment" and not within the sphere of contemplated objects.

Secondly, the reaction of "other" to "me" is obviously of many kinds. A stone reacts as an object of perception and so does all the "external" world, including human bodies. It is possible to feel or to think from the point of view of such an object and, as it were, to reverse in imagination the process as ordinarily conceived. The stone or the body attracts my attention ; and in that way it appears active and I appear to be passive. This is to see the experience of "stone perceived," as it were, from the point of view of the stone. But the "other" in this relation is quite different in kind from the "other" when I

speaking of other minds in communication with mine. The latter type of other-relation is found in the use of language for thought, in co-operation in action and in sympathy and love, and in fact in every experience of other minds known or felt in communication. This is the fundamental fact of all social life : and social life, not isolated individual life, is the datum for psychology and logic. Minds in communication are only with difficulty thought of separately, and there is no evidence for the existence of any mind not in communication with other minds.

We need not jump to the conclusion that there is no "other" in mental experience or enjoyment. Aristotle seems to have hinted at that in his phrases about universal *νοῦς*, which led the mediaeval Arabians and some Scholastics to say that mind was not "individual" at all. Some modern mythology in regard to the universal Ego and the Group Mind may imply the same concept. But that is not what is suggested here. There is, it is admitted, some meaning in the phrase "other mind" : but it is maintained that the meaning of "other" here is very different from the meaning of "other" where it refers to the subject-object relation. In the most general sense the "other" in the case of mind is *contributory*, by contrast with the "other" as object or subject which is exclusive. The contact of minds is not like addition but like mutual inclusion, such as we see (in the contemplated world) in the union of the gametes in generation : but even this is only a metaphor, for the relation of "me" to "other" in the case of mind is unique and occurs, as we may now say, only in the area of enjoyment. How far that area extends is a further question : and in order to answer it, the term "enjoyment" would have

to be still more closely scrutinised. There is a sense in which I "communicate" with all realities and do not simply enter into the cognitive subject-object relation in regard to them. But that section of philosophic analysis is full of pitfalls and many good thinkers who have adventured there have fallen into the bottomless abyss of vagueness. It is enough for our present argument to confine our attention to the sphere of what is actually called "mind," within which language exists. One may indeed communicate with stones but one does not converse with them; and in regard to birds we may omit here the peculiarities of a St. Francis or a Scholar Gipsy. The sphere of mind, being analysed, shows a contact between one and "others." Therefore it seems reasonable to suggest that I am aware that there are "other" minds by enjoyment.

Again, the so-called "highest" types, as well as the most primitive types, of mental enjoyment show no distinction of "me" and "other minds." What Spinoza called the enjoyment of God is not personal or private: nor is the *visio beatifica* of Thomas Aquinas. To this experience Plato refers in his concept of Eros and Aristotle in his "theorising" or contemplative life. Indications, of course, can be found in simpler experiences. When we "agree," as we say, that two and two make four, not merely are two minds related to one proposition and not merely is the identical proposition "in two minds": but the mental activity involved is, in one sense, not mine and yours. Here again the danger is that we may imagine that there is no distinction: but a distinction of which we are not conscious may still exist. The point is that the type of experience to which Plato, Aquinas, and Spinoza refer is outside of or distinct as

a whole from the experience of the "others" of sense-perception. Therefore I know of other minds by enjoyment.

It should be noted that the argument has dealt with the existence of other minds, not the content of other minds. The problem is how we come to believe that there are other minds, not how we come to know what other minds do ; and the hypothesis here stated is that the existence of other minds is a direct experience, but in enjoyment and not in contemplation.

Clearly the further question as to the relation of "enjoyment," in this extended sense, to that which is not enjoyment would have to be faced. The answer to it might necessitate a re-writing of metaphysics : but probably a great part of what the best philosophers have said would be found to imply the distinction of non-personal enjoyment and the contemplated world. It is perhaps what is meant by Spinoza's *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*.

If there is any truth in this contention, serious results would follow in regard to all objects of knowledge. Sense-data and scientific objects of knowledge as well as space and time, at least in some aspects, would be what they are in a relation which is not fundamentally a relation to "my" mind and "your" mind, but is a relation to a kind of reality within which the distinction between "mine" and "other" minds is of subordinate importance. The real world would not, then, be built up out of "personal" experience into general experience, but in the reverse order. Scientific objects would, in a sense, be more primitive in experience than sense-data. The logical order in the relation between what Locke and Hume called "impressions of sense" and "abstractions" would be

precisely the *reverse* of what they thought. Lines and squares and, still more, numbers, would not be "derived from" sense-data but sense-data from these. Perhaps even the old distinction between primary and secondary qualities may be connected with an "enjoyment" which is not distinguished as "mine" and "other" and an enjoyment which is so distinguished : for the analysis of enjoyment in the development of mental life proceeds parallel to the analysis of perceived objects. I discover "my" enjoyment when I distinguish "my" body among objects.

What has been said still leaves some truth in the traditional view that sense-data are guides to a knowledge of other minds. It is reasonable enough to conclude that, if enjoyment of mind is not fundamentally connected with "my" body any more than "yours," then the area of enjoyment may be wider in fact than "I" can at the moment definitely and directly experience. Enjoyment, then, which is the peculiar fact which shows that mind is present, may be supposed to accompany other bodies which I see walking about, although I have no direct proof, by communication, that they think. But from this point of view, we are not concluding that "other" minds exist because bodies behave peculiarly. We know from a different source that there *are* other minds ; but *where* they are we discover from hints given in sensory perception. What we mean when we say that other mind is where we see other body is only that this complex of sense-data, a perceived human body, is a permanent possibility of communication : but I do not really know that there is another mind, "enjoying" experience, there, until I hold converse with it.

The conclusion, in any case, seems to be that the

distinction of my mind from "other" minds exists in a very special type of experience, which may be called a joint enjoyment ; and therefore we know that other minds exist, not by an analysis of contemplated objects, but by an enjoyment which may be, in some sense, an enjoyment of other minds.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNICATION

LET it be granted that the presence of other minds in or to a mind is a kind of enjoyment rather than contemplation. Some distinction would still remain between that kind of enjoyment by which "I" am related to "my" mental process and, on the other hand, that by which "I" am related to "yours."

The experience of social intercourse is very different from the experience of contemplation. Other minds are not objects. But is the experience of social intercourse, within which we discover other minds, a third ultimate experience, neither contemplation nor enjoyment? If so, then the well-worn dualism of philosophy is a mistake; for there is a kind of reality, an "other" mind, which is not given either in contemplation or in enjoyment. How can it be given? Alexander says of an "other" mind: "That a mind is there is an assurance. It is not invented by inference or analogy, but is an act of faith, forced on us by a peculiar experience."¹ But an act of faith is perhaps only an unproved hypothesis; and the hypothesis can be proved if it can be shown that the evidence for "other" mind is enjoyment which is not individualised.

The enjoyment by one mind of "other" minds will

¹ *Space, Time and Deity*, ii. 37.

be found to be experienced in communication ; but communication, as generally understood, refers chiefly, if not only, to the contact of minds in thinking, through language.¹ It is, therefore, confined to the sphere of meaning ; and minds are generally understood to be in communication when one meaning is, in some sense, present to them. But this emphasis on cognition is perhaps misleading. Psychologically cognition is not the simplest nor the most fundamental activity which distinguishes mental from other forms of life ; and in metaphysics it will perhaps be found that difficulties arise in explaining the contact of minds, if the experience of cognition or of communication in this narrower sense is taken as a starting-point. The assumptions involved are too obscure. The term communication, therefore, will be used in what follows to include reference to all the chief kinds of contact between minds,—co-operation and sympathy or affection, as well as cognitive communication. Of these the most fundamental is co-operation, which is a kind of conation. It will now be necessary to analyse the facts given in the experience of communication in order to discover in what sense some kind of enjoyment implies the presence of other minds.

When we are not in communication, clearly I do

¹ Language is a joint enterprise. Cf. Alice Meynell's myth :

Whose is the speech
That moves the voices of this lonely beech ?
Out of the long west did this wild wind come—
Oh strong and silent ! And the tree was dumb,
Ready and dumb, until
The dumb gale struck it on the darken'd hill.
Two memories,
Two powers, two promises, two silences
Closed in this cry, closed in these thousand leaves
Articulate.

not have present to me the object of your thinking. In common language, however, social intercourse or communication is expressed as the conveyance of the object of my thinking to yours or *vice versa*. We can talk about the same thing : and we can also react emotionally to the same situation and act for the same purpose. In these experiences the reference, object or stimulus, of the mental processes is identical. So far as I enjoy my mental process in thinking of an object, I continue to enjoy it when, by communication with you, the object becomes yours. No change can have occurred in the object, or communication would be impossible : and I have entered into a relation with you which is not in any way like the relation of either of us to the object. The former relation has something to do with mental process, but not in so far as mental process is a response to an object. For since the object is identical, the process is identical at least in so far as it is characterised by reference to the object. But any mental process is characterised also by enjoyment ; and if some change has occurred when " my " object becomes yours, it is probably the enjoyment which is modified in social intercourse : therefore, in some sense, communication is a sort of enjoyment of " other " minds. Indeed it is difficult to see how co-operation or language can be understood except in terms of enjoyment as contrasted with contemplation.

It is possible that there is no enjoyment at all which is not social enjoyment, at least in so far as there is no mind which is not in fact somehow in contact with other minds. It is possible that what distinguishes mind from non-mental living things is not enjoyment as such but *social* enjoyment. But that is another matter. Clearly " I " can make " you " enjoy a

mental process and I can know that you are enjoying it. That is communication. But my awareness of your enjoyment is not contemplation. What you enjoy perceiving (as object) I get at by contemplation of your behaviour ; but that this behaviour, as distinct from the behaviour of a stone, is enjoyed and that your perceiving is enjoyed can be believed only because it is as a matter of fact experienced as enjoyed. This does not mean that it is enjoyed as "mine" : for again if it were, communication would be inconceivable. The enjoyment which is reciprocal is not mine alone or yours alone but ours. In one sense, then, I do not enjoy "your" mind nor you "mine," but both of us enjoy "our" mental process.

It is perhaps misleading to speak of the enjoyment of "other" minds, because, in any case, your enjoyment cannot become mine. But this is not implied in the present hypothesis. The distinction remains between mine and yours, but it is a distinction within a kind of enjoyment which is called "ours." Communication unites the minds but does not unify them. When I make you or you make me enjoy a mutual process of co-operation or "thinking of the same object," then enjoyment becomes common to both. Thus in a sense I enjoy "your" mind, but only metaphorically—in so far as "our" includes "your" enjoyed process.

The hypothesis here suggested does not imply that communication is secondary either in logic or in "nature" to individual enjoyment. In the conveyance of meaning or the initiation of co-operative action the minds, which before were not, afterwards come into a joint enjoyment : but communication in this sense is a very late stage of mental experience. On

the other hand, as far back as it is possible to imagine mental process at all, there is in fact some form of communication ; for the child perhaps communicates with its mother while it is still in the womb. The contact between minds neither precedes nor succeeds the distinction between minds. The contact with "other" minds exists whenever and wherever there is mind at all. This is what is meant by saying that the discovery of other minds is made within enjoyment which is not individualised.

Again, it should be noted that there are many stages of communication. The length of time is not very important, but the intensity of the communication certainly is important. We have experience of a casual contact, as when one asks a passer-by for information ; and there are many different intensities of contact leading up to the most intimate co-operation of lovers in a common danger. These are the experiences which are here referred to as enjoyment ; and it is perhaps possible to speak in this sense of an enjoyment of other minds.

When a situation for conation is such that the conation (the process for which the situation is a stimulus) is co-operative, then other minds are enjoyed ; for the process which is enjoyed is not "my" process but "our" process. When an object for cognition is such that the cognition is communicated, then other minds are enjoyed. The minds do not cease to be more than one because the situation or the object is one ; for co-operation and communication have no meaning unless in reference to more than one mind. But the enjoyment ceases to be in the same sense "mine" as it was before it became "ours." In communication your enjoyment is present, as mine is, within what is fundamentally "ours."

One further explanatory note should be added. The mere number of the minds is irrelevant to the argument. The vote of the majority counted as units is of no importance here. The point lies in the *relation*, not in the number of the terms. Many minds may exist between which there is no co-operation or cognitive communication ; but the enjoyment of the processes of each of these remains separate : and nothing can be perceived or done by these which is peculiar to minds in communication.

A comparison may now be made between communication and other kinds of contact. The contact between two realities is of many different kinds, but that particular kind of contact which dominates philosophy is the contact of externals. There is a contact between two stones and a similar contact is generally believed to occur in sense-impressions. The objects perceived or the sense-data attract attention and the perceiver attends. A sort of action and reaction occurs. The object, whatever else it is, is pre-eminently *not* the perceiver and the perceiver is not the object, as the one stone is not the other stone in contact with it. But the familiar metaphor of our inherited language allows us to say that the object perceived is somehow "in the mind" of the perceiver : and some Realists have made the inference that therefore in some sense the mind is "out there," where the object is, when perception occurs. The contact between mind and its object is, in a very important sense, *different* from the contact of what are called "material" realities : for the percipient is imagined to "cover" or include the object of perception, but the object does not "cover" the percipient.

There is still another kind of contact—namely that

between minds. This is, of course, real contact, unless we are to deny that more than one mind exists ; and being real contact, the contact of minds is somehow similar to the contact of stones. There is, in all contact, the distinction between "this" and "the other." But where minds are in contact, the "other" mind does not seem to be an object similar to the objects of perception or the sense-data. Nor does that "other" appear to be similar to the scientific objects (atoms, etc.) which are parts of nature ; for the relation of the scientific object to sense-data, whatever it is, is not the relation of mind to sense-data.

The contact of one mind with another seems to have less of that mutual exclusion which is thought to exist in the case of one object and another ; and it seems to have more of that element of inclusiveness which is expressed in the statement that the object is "in the mind." Clearly, exclusion and inclusion imply metaphors ; but they represent, at least vaguely, a real difference of character between two kinds of relation. The communication between minds, however, appears to be of the same kind as the contact between all kinds of living things ; and indeed the contact between living things is perhaps one of the chief reasons for distinguishing them from what is usually called matter. Of course, matter reacts to stimulus as the chemist would say ; and, in a sense, the pressure of one stone on another is a sort of reaction to stimulus, as the physicist might say : but there is a distinct kind of reaction and a distinct kind of stimulus in the contact between living things. It will be better for the argument, here, nevertheless, if it is confined to mind and does not include the wider category of life. The contact of living things will then be further distin-

guished from the contact of those particular living things which are called minds : but clearly there is co-operation and there are other kinds of communication between living things other than minds.

Minds in contact show what is called co-operation ; and this belongs to the psychological category of conation. It is joint conation ; and possibly all conation is group conation or joint conation. Most obviously, however, two or more minds are in contact when, for example, the products of art or industry come into existence. Social institutions and material products of art or industry are results which distinguish the co-operation of minds from whatever co-operation is to be found, for example, among animals or birds. It may be that only the rate of change is different ; but so far as we know, social institutions differ more in different periods than, for example, the herds of horses or flockings of birds. Similarly the tools men use (including their houses, clothes, etc.) differ in different ages more than the nests of different generations of birds. The co-operation of minds, then, is a contact within a peculiar kind of reality. A part of the explanation, in metaphysics, of the realities called social institutions and works of art or industry lies in the *enjoyment* of the mental processes involved ; for the fact of co-operation must be referred to an enjoyment *within* which the difference of individual minds is apparent, and the relation of the mental processes or series of percipient events which are individual minds is like the relation of two legs in walking. Walking cannot exist without at least two legs ; for spatial passage on one leg is hopping, which is an entirely different process.

Invariably in accompaniment with this group

conation is the group-thinking expressed in language. The contact of two or more minds which have, as we say, the same meaning, seems to be significant chiefly because in this case the "meaning" seems to be "in" the two minds at once, and therefore the two minds seem to overlap: for if, as Realists say, the mind is where its object is, then if two minds have the same object they are superimposed, each on the other. But these metaphors are dangerous.

A more useful metaphor can be drawn from two-eyed vision. We do not see a different object with each eye, but one object with two eyes; and even if only the distance of the object is the relation revealed by two-eyed, as contrasted with one-eyed, vision, that distance is a very important relation of the object. Two-eyed vision, then, is significant here not because of the number of the eyes but because of the relation between them. One eye in me and one eye in you would not have two-eyed vision: it is essential that they should be the two eyes of the same person. Similar relations are revealed by two-mind cognition, as contrasted with one-mind cognition (if there could be any such). The contrast of course is not dependent upon there being two rather than three or four: the fundamental contrast is between one and any number more than one. In any number more than one contact occurs: and it is the contact not the number of minds which is important.

Psychologically there is a third kind of contact under the heading of feeling or emotion. It is called affection or sympathy. It "colours" co-operation and (cognitive) communication. It is the "tone" of mental group-life. The important element in it for the present argument is that in it the contact between

minds seems to be well represented by the metaphor of "unity." To be "at one" with another person is something more than to have the same meaning, to see the same object, or to co-operate in the same enterprise. It seems to include other realities besides "minds," for we speak of an affection for a dog, or even a place, whatever that means. But clearly what Aristotle calls "friendship" and Plato calls Eros is a contact between minds, which is distinct in kind from the contact of mind and its object, or between realities which are not minds. Feeling is in a parlous position in the psychology of to-day, perhaps because quantitative measurement of the experience referred to as feeling or emotion is more difficult than in regard to other mental processes ; but for the argument here in metaphysics or philosophy it is enough if the particular kind of mental contact in love or friendship be noted.

We may now endeavour to give some impression of the characteristics of mental communication by the use of another analogy or metaphor. From what has been said it is clear that communication is an ultimate kind of relation which cannot be explained in the terms of another kind. All that we have said is that it is *not* similar or that it differs in some way from other kinds of contact where "this" and "other" are to be found. It may be useful, therefore, to show in what sense it is different.

There are two fundamental relationships in logic, affirmation and negation. For example, "this paper is white" and "this paper is not blue." In affirmation the predicate may be said to be included in the subject : in negation it is excluded from the subject. The exact logical relation is not here in question, for

affirmation and negation are being here used simply for the sake of a metaphor. The point of importance is the relation of exclusion in negations. The "contact" of subject and predicate in negation is no less real than the contact in affirmation, but it is represented in Euler's symbols as the relation between two circles, each of which is entirely outside the other. The exclusion involved in a negation is, however, in a sense an inclusion of the terms within a universe of discourse. We have therefore in negation an example of inclusion and exclusion combined. Now, if the relation of mind to its object is like the relation of the terms of an affirmation, the relation of mind to mind in communication is like the relation of each term of a negation to the including universe of discourse. Two features of this relation are to be noticed. First, there is no "subordination" of one of the terms to the other, as there is in affirmation; and secondly, there is a world within which the terms are related which is distinct from other worlds. Mind in communication with mind is thus distinguished as "this" and "other" in a special sense; and neither is "in" the other as objects of knowledge are "in" the mind, nor are they so "external" in their contact as objects of nature are.

Analysis, therefore, of the facts given in the experience of communication seems to show that there is a distinct type of enjoyment, which is genuinely enjoyment and not contemplation, within which individual minds appear. There is every likelihood that "your" enjoyment appears earlier in my experience than "my" enjoyment and that in fact I discover other minds *before* I discover my own; but the history of the experience of enjoyment is a problem for psychology. Here the philosophical implications of

the experience are more important ; and these seem to indicate that the relationship between minds in communication is fundamentally different in kind from either the relationship of objects or the relationship of minds to objects.

Communication is studied psychologically in the various forms of social psychology ; and as bodily behaviour forms part of the data of all psychology, so that kind of behaviour called language and custom provides data in social psychology. These are, as it were, the social body with which is connected the joint enjoyment of communication. The relation of this contact of minds to the signs used for communication is probably an example of the general relation of mind to body. The signs are visible (letters or pictures and gestures) or auditory (speech). The appearance of letters or of articulated sounds may make one conclude that there is *meaning* connected with them, although one may be mistaken. Unfamiliar characters, for example, of a Chinese shape, may have no meaning at all, although they seem to Western eyes to be signs ; but the experience of meaning is not derived from sense-data. Their connection with the meaning is a relation similar to that of body and mind. But for the present argument it is not necessary to discuss this relation : for whatever the relation of mind to body, mental process is distinct from sense-data and scientific symbols. Communication, then, which somehow rests upon meaning, is a kind of reality which is ultimate within the world of minds : and as a relation between minds, of course, cannot be reduced to or entirely explained by the terms of that relation, for the relation is not its terms and the terms are not their relation.

Communication has this further importance for metaphysics that it is the means by which the ultimates goodness, truth, and beauty come to be known ; for these are, as it were, the special objects of that kind of process which is enjoyed jointly. The awareness of what are called the good, true, and beautiful has been connected by Alexander with the compresence of two or more minds. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the good, true, and beautiful are in any sense subjective ; for a further analysis of communication will show that it is merely the particular kind of process to which are given those contemplated objects called ultimate values.

Communication is the means by which these ultimate objective reals are made to appear in experience. The good would not be in awareness but for co-operation, just as colour would not be seen but for the eye : but what we call the good is not dependent for its existence upon co-operation between minds ; and the same must be said of the true and the beautiful. The contact of mind with mind is the necessary presupposition for awareness "in" each mind of these objects ; for if, by an absurd hypothesis, there could be one mind active alone, the good, true, and beautiful would not be in awareness, but they would nevertheless be in existence. Their existence is not more mental or psychic than is the existence of greenness in a tree.

The way in which each of these ultimates is revealed is sometimes misrepresented by philosophers who are more concerned with the true than with the good or the beautiful. We can, of course, *know* something *about* the two latter : but what we know is the truth. The fundamental relation to the good is not knowledge

but action ; and knowledge *about* the good is not superior to or inclusive of action. Similarly in regard to aesthetics or a knowledge about the beautiful. On the other hand, knowing is a sort of action and therefore knowing the truth is in some sense a contact with the good ; and we can feel the beauty “ of ” truth and goodness. This is perhaps obvious, but it is sometimes forgotten. The important point for the present argument is the character of the presence of these ultimates in awareness : for that presence is always a presence to more than one mind *in communication*. It is not, then, the mere existence of many minds which reveals the ultimates, but only that relation between some minds which we have named communication.

Alexander has analysed well the experience of the discovery of these ultimates. These are his words :—

Appreciations arise out of intercourse between minds. [The words “ arise out of ” are ambiguous.] For without that intercourse the individual mind merely finds itself set over (? against) objects with which it is compresent. . . . We only become aware that a proposition is false when we find it entertained by another (mind) and our own judgement disagrees with his. We then are aware that it is not merely possible for us to make mistakes, as we find ourselves doing in the course of our experiences, but that an error may be somehow a real existence. Thereafter . . . we can judge ourselves *with the eyes of the community*. We judge ourselves, *in enjoyment*, as if we were in our mistake another person. . . . It is social intercourse, therefore, which makes us aware that . . . [This sentence should continue, I think, with the words “ truth, goodness, and beauty exist,” but Alexander writes :] “ there is a reality compounded of ourselves and the object, and that in that relation (*i.e.* appreciation or social intercourse) the

object has a character which it would not have except for that relation.”¹

The last phrases may seem to imply that there are “psychic additions” in the ultimate values which might make them “subjective” or at least not as completely objects as are colour and size. The argument that these values are composite, however, seems weakened by such phrases as—“while the appreciation of the mind is needed to make the object true or good, there is a *corresponding character in the object* of which in our appreciation of it we are aware.” Why should we not then call this “corresponding character” the truth or goodness or beauty “of” the object? Again, Alexander says “we shall have to indicate what it is *in the object* which qualifies it to be the object of collective appreciation.” This is consistent with the part “mind” plays in the remainder of the argument: but it may seem inconsistent with such phrases as “the value of the object is not something which is already in the things themselves. . . . Values are therefore mental inventions.” The phrases of which the latter is an example seem to imply that value is “subjective”: but it is clear otherwise that Alexander means only that the ultimate values cannot be experienced except in social intercourse or communication.

Perhaps the difficulty in giving to the truth of propositions and the beauty of objects their objectivity is that enjoyment is assumed to be individual. It should be noticed that in one of the phrases above quoted Alexander says—“We judge ourselves in enjoyment”; and here he may imply that “we” enjoy as truly as “I” enjoy. The pronoun “we” is indeed very important. It is clearly not

¹ *Space, Time and Deity*, ii. p. 239.

merely "I" *plus* you or they. It expresses a real distinction in the relations between persons ; and these relations, as it were, fade away from "enjoyment" into "contemplation" as the first person passes into the second and the second into the third. But whenever "we" is correctly used, the reference is to a kind of "enjoyment."

The presence of "another" mind is clearly implied in any perception of truth, goodness, or beauty, and the other mind thus present is not a part of *the object* but of the subject ; it could, however, be present and yet not in the object, only if this other mind were not contemplated but enjoyed. Thus if other minds are enjoyed, the objectivity of the realities discovered through social intercourse is secured. The "standard" mind or the "impartial spectator," to which Alexander refers, "who represents the judgement of the collective mind" is "mind-in-communication," which implies the existence of joint enjoyment.

The hypothesis, then, that mind is enjoyed in some cases when the enjoyment is not individualised seems to be consonant with the peculiar relation of the ultimates (goodness, truth, and beauty) to more than one mind. It would perhaps be better if these realities, so discovered, were not called "values" but ideals ; for in the word "value" a dangerous implication of subjectivism occurs. Their nature, however, cannot be discussed here. They are important for the present argument as affording additional evidence of the particular characteristics of communication, for they are the ultimate unities towards which all "objects" or situations point when they become "the same" for two or more minds in communication. And from what has been said before, when it was pointed out

that the object remains identical if I become aware that the object for me is also an object for you, it would seem to follow in the case of the ultimates also that the change, when minds go together in respect to them, is a change in enjoyment.

CHAPTER V

ENJOYMENT AND EXISTENCE

IT has been suggested above that there is some distinction between enjoyment of *my* mental process and enjoyment of *our* mental process ; but an opponent might urge that this is precisely the distinction between enjoyment and what is not enjoyment. Therefore a more exact determination of the characteristics of enjoyment is necessary. The sense of the word enjoyment or rather the given reality to which it refers must be made clearer, in order to justify the assertion that, in spite of the distinction between them, there is an identity of kind in the enjoyment of "my" and the enjoyment of "our" mental processes.

It is possible to say that the awareness "of" a process is not enjoyment : but the enjoyment is the process. Thus enjoyment is divided as process is divided ; and if one mental process, called mine, is distinct from another, called yours, then enjoyment is essentially and inevitably individual in the same sense and so far as minds are individual. In this case, however, it would follow that knowing is being, and that to exist is the same as to know. Either the process never comes into awareness or the process is the awareness. Either the mind is never known at all or its being known is its existence when it enjoys

itself. Idealists have indeed commonly argued that, although the object is present to a subject in cognition, yet there is a type of experience in which the object and the subject are one. They sometimes, 'more correctly, say that in this type of experience there is no object or subject, which is more correct because, if two realities are "really" one, the two do not really exist.

This appears to be the type of experience which Bergson calls "intuition," in so far as he identifies intuition with vital process. It is the type of experience to which Croce, following Hegel, refers when he identifies thought with reality or the history of philosophy with philosophy. Thus in vital process or in reality, a *dualism* is preserved, with the proviso that it is synthesised or absorbed or "solved." The attempt is here made to preserve the characteristics of knowledge in the sphere of existence or being or becoming. Reality is one and knowledge gives duality ; therefore in order that knowledge should not be illusory, knowledge itself must be one ; and that it can be only if it is, in fact, reality or reality is it. Now in no case can knowledge avoid the implication of dualism unless when the knower and the known are identical, in self-consciousness. The argument is familiar and need not be given more elaborately.

The enjoyment of mind may mean this kind of awareness, which is identical with the being of that of which there is awareness ; and if so, there could not be enjoyment of other minds. Enjoyment may be thought to be inevitably individual *because* I am in fact not any other person ; but if this is the reason, then enjoyment is not a form of knowing but a form of being. That is to say, the fact that one individual,

person, or mental series, is not another is undeniable ; and, if that is given as the logical ground for saying that an enjoyment of a mental series is not an enjoyment of another mental series, then the enjoyment must *be* the mental series. The old use of the phrase self-consciousness seemed to imply that the consciousness A was the same thing as the consciousness B of the consciousness A : and in the use of the term enjoyment, one may not always be on guard against that possible identification of enjoyment as an awareness and being.

No harm, indeed, is done in calling one thing by two names ; and we have already said that one reality can have many relations without ceasing to be identically the same reality. But two realities cannot be one. To enjoy my process is not identical with the process which I enjoy. There is no possible sense in which a subject can be an object ; nor is there any sense in which both can be some third thing. Of course there may be a reality not known, a process not enjoyed, but when knowledge or enjoyment exists then there is some kind of dualism. The impossibility of an identity of knower and known in self-consciousness has been shown many times, and perhaps nowhere better than in Laird's statement of Realism.¹ But the same kind of argument holds in regard to enjoyment. The enjoyment is not the enjoyed.

Mental process exists. So far enjoyment does not enter in. How do I know *that* it exists and *what* it is ?

¹ " It is true that the self can behold itself, but this self observation is never the identity of observing and being. If it were, how could there be any occasion for attending to ourselves ? We cannot help *being* ourselves, and if our conscious being were identical with this knowing, we should always have a complete answer to all psychological questions through the mere fact of existing " (Laird, *Realism*, p. 169).

To know or to be aware of that and what, is not to *be* that and of that sort. I do not know mental process by contemplation, that is to say, by the method used in knowing or reaction to every reality which is *not* mental. I know that mental process exists and, in part, what it is, by enjoyment; but, in this sense of the word, enjoyment is as distinct from "being" as contemplation or knowledge is distinct from the being of the object known. Enjoyment is a method. It is a relation, *not* a term of the relation of enjoying. It is not the mental process itself.¹

To say, then, that I enjoy your process does not identify me with you, as it certainly does not identify my enjoyment of myself with myself when I say that I enjoy myself. It does not identify the enjoyment of contemplation with contemplation when I say that I enjoy contemplating an object. This is an assertion which is contradictory to the statements of Bergson in regard to intuition, or Hegelians in regard to self-consciousness. But this assertion is believed to be false because it is believed that, unless there is identity of knowing and being in regard to mental process,

¹ In the argument of an earlier chapter it was admitted that enjoyment may possibly be the name, not of the process by which the "-ing" of experience enters into awareness, but of that which characterises the "-ing" as contrasted with the "-ed." Thus enjoyment would be the name for some characteristic of the whole group—seeing, hearing, etc., as contrasted with the group of objects, which are the seen, heard, etc. But even so, the seeing, hearing, etc., are in awareness somehow, apart of course from introspection. The difficulty of disentangling this being in awareness from the existence of the "-ing" would seem to be the reason for the mistaken identification which takes place in Bergson's "intuition" and Croce's "self-consciousness." Clearly the "-ing" is so very different from the "-ed" that the term enjoyment, as used by Alexander, may not allow of a distinction between the being of an "-ing" and the enjoyment of it; but there seems to be something in the case of an "-ing" which is analogous to contemplation in the case of an "-ed" and yet does not turn the "-ing" into an "-ed."

mental process itself cannot be experienced or given. It remains, therefore, to show how it can be and is given as a factor in experience *without* implying any such identity of enjoyment and what is enjoyed.

The idealist theory arises not so much from the character of the enjoyment as from the supposed character of the mind itself. Let us, then, put aside the problem how I enjoy and consider first *what* I enjoy when it is said that I enjoy my own mental process. The fundamental question is—can anything be given which is not an object ?

The subjective element in experience, it is said, cannot be known or enjoyed as an object, for then clearly it would not be subjective. But if its being is distinct from its being known, it is an object ; for that is what is meant by an object. Subject is that “for” which all objects exist, and objects are all that is given. The mental process cannot be given to itself, for then the “it” which is given would be identical with the “itself” which is not given. This is all, however, based upon the hypothesis that what is given is necessarily given in the same way as objects are given in sense-perception or thought.

Let another hypothesis be tried. Suppose that the subjective element is indeed given, as all other elements in experience are, but that the way in which it is given is distinct from the way in which other elements are and may therefore be called by a distinct name. Suppose that the subjective element is not given “to itself” but “to the object.” Do not attempt to repeat in catching the subject the habits acquired in snaring the object ; but let the object do its work. We know that the object of contemplation “attracts attention.” Now when the object attracts attention, the subject is

given. When the thing contemplated appears, the mental process is given. The reality called mind is like all other realities in being given ; but it is given in a special way, called enjoyment. Enjoyment then is the reverse of the relation of contemplation. It is the subjective element " for " the object ; but we must beware lest we make the object into a subject. The object does not contemplate the subject : nor does it enjoy the subject. Even to speak of the " point of view " of the object is misleading, for the object has no point of view. It remains an object. The process given when it appears, however, is enjoyed when the object is contemplated ; and this may be what is meant by the dangerous phrase sometimes used, that the contemplation *is* the enjoyment of mind.

Language is somewhat inadequate, for it is infected with the practical needs of earlier ages. The view we take of reality is so completely dominated by our going out to meet it and our interference with it, that we hardly notice that it comes to meet us and interferes with us. But this second process, the " equal and opposite " reaction to our action, is, in a sense, the same process the other way up. The relation in one case is reversed in the other ; and this second relation is called enjoyment, for in that is found or appears the reality called mind.

The enjoyment then is a relation ; and the term of that relation, which is called the mental process enjoyed, is not identical with the relation itself. Therefore there can be one enjoyment of two or more minds ; or at any rate there is no logical ground for denying that there is.

Now, however, a further meaning can be seen in the idea that one object is an object " for " two or

more minds. The views of the subjects contemplating remain distinct ; but reverse the relation and, since the object is the same, the enjoyment is the same. Thus we may equally well say that there are two or more minds "for" any object, as that there is one object "for" many minds. The reversal of the relation of contemplation, however, may imply errors. It must be remembered, then, that relations are of two kinds at least—(a) relations between realities of the same order (stone to stone), and (b) relations between realities of different orders (particular to universal, etc.). Now the relation of cognition or conation is of the second kind. The mental process and its object are not of the same order ; and we must not treat the mental process as if it were an object of contemplation. What it may be for archangels does not concern us here. When, therefore, we reverse the relation of conation or contemplation, we must not expect to find the mental process to be a term of the same kind as an object. The attempt to find such an object has led to the description of the "transparency" of mind,—for, of course, you cannot see or feel or push the mind. To catch a mind without an object is like trying to catch a particular without a universal.

But it may be said that this is merely playing with words. The mental process is mine in a sense in which the object is not. I cannot reverse the process any more than I can reverse the time series, for knowing or conation has only one "direction." The reply is simply an appeal to experience. The relation is actually felt both ways ; and that is the peculiarity of mental process. That is probably what is meant by idealists who say that the mind knows itself, or that in self-consciousness knowing and existence are

identical ; for the experience of conation certainly has not only one "direction." When I push I feel the resistance ; and the resistance is the reversal of the push. When I attend the object attracts me, or when the object attracts me I attend : either phrase will suit the facts. Similarly in regard to intellectual objects, when we pass over the series of numbers 1, 2, 3 . . . , we experience not only the relation of each to what comes next but also the relation of each to what comes before it. The relation has two "directions" or, if this phrase is preferable, there are two relations felt at once. Again, memory is a sort of reversal of the time relations of a mind. In a sense it is like the switching backward of the eyes of a person moving, who is watching a stationary object. Every one knows how the eyes move in the head, keeping in view the object while the head swings. When the person is on a rotating chair, the eyes perform (1) a movement reverse to that of the head, and (2) sudden jerks forward, as it were, to catch up the body. Memory is the following of an object passing out of sight. It is a sort of reversal of the current of life : and in so far as every mental process has both this turning backwards and the movement forward, we have throughout mental process examples of the two aspects of experience, one of which seems to be a reversal of the other. Enjoyment, then, is so far distinct from the mental process enjoyed as contemplation is distinct from the object contemplated.

Another difficulty may arise, not from the supposed identity of knowing and being in the self, but from the supposed unification of minds when two or more are given together in enjoyment. For then it may be said that being given together proves them to be "really" or

in a "higher" unity only one. Communication and co-operation then must disappear, for there is no sense in saying that any reality co-operates with itself. Joint enjoyment in this case would seem to be a real destruction of the separateness of minds thus given together.

The unity to which this argument points is indeed important. All experience shows an unreconciled dualism ; but this dualism, of course, implies the existence of units. The units are real and existent, and only when the existent is *given* is there dualism or plurality. But you do not "solve" the *dualism* of givenness by saying that it implies the existence of a unit ; you merely point out that givenness is not the same as existence.

If the phrases of Strong may be used here, what is given is the existent, but its existence is not its givenness.¹ If there were no distinction, if its relatedness, as given, actually and "internally" constituted its being, then we should find it impossible logically to say that it was anything at all. But the character of relations as external has already been discussed.

When, therefore, it is said that other minds are discovered in enjoyment, the givenness of such minds is said to be identical with the givenness of the individual mind in communication. There is, of course, still a sub-distinction within the givenness of such minds ; but as minds in communication they differ from other non-mental existents which are given in other ways ; and even the fact that the givenness of the two or more minds may be the same, would not prove that there are not two or more but only one.

Some philosophers, however, rely upon the suggestion that the unity of any "one" mind is *of the same*

¹ *Origin of Consciousness.*

kind as the unity of two or more minds in society, and this is sometimes the ground for their treating society as a unit containing or synthesising or absorbing its members. Thus society would be one mind in the same sense as a person is one mind. This may not be explicitly stated, for idealists do not often distinguish similarity from identity ; and the phrase " of the same kind " may mean either " similar " or " identical." However, enjoyment is taken as the principle of unity in an individual mind : for it may be said that, even if the enjoyment is not identical with the existent enjoyed, still I am the " same " person because the reversed relation of contemplation connects one series of mental acts called " mine." The acts of contemplation may differ with the objects contemplated, but the enjoyment of all of them is one, and for that reason, mine and not yours. When, therefore, the enjoyment is an enjoyment of " our " process, the process is a process of *one* reality. Minds enjoyed in society are, then, but one mind.

In reply it must be urged that we should not exaggerate the unity of the minds in a society nor the distinction between the states of one mind. The self has a unity which includes a diversity ; and persons in society, though really separate, are not unrelated. But the two kinds of unity should be distinguished. The dissociation of a personality, indeed, throws some light on the association between persons, for as in association we have a going together of two or more personalities hitherto separate, so in dissociation we have a separating into two or more personalities of what has hitherto been one. Of course, the unconscious or subconscious or suppressed or repressed elements in mental life are not here referred to. The

comparison is made only with cases in which there are in the same body two or more conscious systems with memories and activities apparently independent. The examples of "fugue" described by Rivers may be used as instances of this type of dissociation. "A person in a fugue," he writes, "shows what is usually described as a difference of personality, but the difference may be slight. . . . The existence of independent consciousness, which thus shows itself in the fugue and in cases of double personality, separates these cases very definitely from those in which experience becomes unconscious, and, though active, gives no evidence of any independent conscious existence."¹ So Morton Prince suggests the term "co-consciousness," which will fit admirably with communication between persons in the ordinary sense. The person, or at least his body, goes through two quite distinct series of acts. He goes in one mood to a part of a town, where he "comes to himself" and finds he does not remember how he got there; but he can obtain evidence from others that he talked and acted while getting there in what appeared to be a normal manner. He has been, then, two quite independent memory-systems and mental-bodily processes. Each memory-system is a conscious unit, which may fairly be called a person; but there is a sense in which the two or more memory-systems can be regarded as together making one individual. The idealist might, therefore, say that their being together is no more a unity than a society of many members is a unity.

The experiences of dissociation are regarded as examples of regression. The amphibian may have needed a complete splitting of its memory-system, so

¹ *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 73 sq.

that the frog need not be worried by memory of its tadpole life. Thus normally we keep in our minds logic-tight compartments for convenience : and it is supposed that primitive types of minds are less integrated than the more civilised.¹ We regard it as natural to "a" mind that it should be one system ; but every mind, not merely in abnormal dissociation but in common life, is only in part integrated and only in a vague sense a single system. Indeed were a mind as complete a unit as Kantians have imagined, it is hard to see how society could exist.

In normal life any man is in contact with many other men, who differ among themselves and in their relation to him. He is, as it were, separated into fragments looking this way and that, in his social relationships ; but he keeps all these together by being, as we say, one person. His political sentiments or complexes, his industrial activities, his religious or emotional sympathies, pull him in different directions. And suppose that this social environment begins to act as the diverse environment of the same tadpole-frog acts : suppose the one man actually is pulled apart. We should then have dissociation, and the cause would be the association of one part, as we call it, of his mind with "other" minds in society. Normally, of course, the various mental activities connected with one body are more closely integrated than are the mental activities of separate bodies : but abnormally powerful suggestion or hypnotism may connect more closely "two" minds in separate bodies. "In the form in which we know it best, hypnotism is an individual and not a collective process," . . . but this "only masks and has by no means obliterated its

¹ Cf. Rivers, *loc. cit.* p. 80 sq.

essentially collective character.”¹ Indeed dissociation is probably “largely the artificial product of hypnotism.” Hypnotism is simply a form of contact, communication or co-operation between minds; but it is abnormal in seeming to show a supersession of one mind by another. The unity is gained at the price of *destroying* the diversity of minds.

Now suggestion in some form is always operating in social life. A mind is being pulled this way and that by other minds. The strain of keeping these different associations integrated may be one of the causes of sleep, in which dissociation normally occurs: and so society is preserved by sleep in which there is no society. The unity of the self and the union of minds in society seem to be always at odds. The force which keeps the mind of one man single, the integration of memory, seems to be similar to the force which keeps society together by the integration of social contact. This force then must be more closely inspected.

As it has been argued above, the process enjoyed does not necessarily and always disclose a separate self or “my” mental process in isolation or in distinction from that of another. Sometimes, indeed, I find thinking or acting which must be called “mine,” but even in this case inspection of the process shows that “mine” must cover a very loose connection of very different mental elements. The process I now enjoy is said to be connected, as “mine,” with a process remembered which occurred yesterday. In some cases I infer a connection. I do not observe it. Indeed sleep has intervened and memory will not serve. If the inference cannot be

¹ Rivers, *op. cit.* p. 103.

made, we say that there is dissociation and that more than one self is discovered. But normally memory provides a bridge : for, as Bergson very well puts it, memory *is* the past in the present. Memory is that activity or process which connects one process with another "in one person" ; and since, for most practical purposes, it is more important that there is a connection between to-day and yesterday than that there is a difference, we usually say that the same person exists all through. The process given in enjoyment spreads, as it were, before and after and is called mine ; but it also spreads in some cases contemporaneously. There are gaps here also between "me" and "you," but I sometimes enjoy also, as given, certain links or bridges in communication.

Communication between minds is thus analogous to memory connecting the selves or processes of to-day and yesterday. For all practical social life it is more important that there is this connection between me and you than that there is a difference ; and therefore we usually, carrying out our practice in the case of ourselves as persons, say that the society to which we both "belong" is more fundamental than you and I. I am the "property" of the state or community. I belong to my community ; not the community to me. This is the ground on which idealists seem to rely for proof of their statement, that social unity is a higher than individual unity or that the person is not realised except in the unity which is the state or the community. But in spite of the analogy, it must be denied that the unity of the self is identical with the unity of selves "in a society."

The difference between me to-day and me yesterday is not the *same kind* of difference as that between me

and you in communication. The relation which bridges one difference, then, is not the same relation as that which bridges the other. As we have shown above, there are many types of the contrast between this and other. I to-day am, indeed, other than I was yesterday ; and I am other than you. But you to-day are not in the least the same as I yesterday. The same " I " enters into the two relationships : but the " other " is a different term in the two cases.

The relation called memory unites past and present mental processes, but the relation in communication unites mental processes of the present. Time is not an illusion and we must take it seriously. Passage or *durée* enters into memory and not into communication, except in so far as memory itself is discovered in the act of communication. Communication of minds, then, implies contemporaneous existence in a sense in which memory does not. Now, even if we are driven to say that the self of to-day is the same as the self of yesterday, it would not follow, from the analogy of memory and communication, that my self was the same as yours ; or if the metaphor of sameness is used in this case, then the sameness of a person cannot be identical in kind with the sameness of a society. The society is in no sense a person, for its unity is not made by memory. Its unity is the com-
presence of two or more minds in communication, which is quite distinct from the presence of a " self to-day " and a " self yesterday " together in memory. It follows that the existence of an enjoyment of a mutual process is no proof of the unity of minds, in that sense of " unity " which holds of the unity of consciousness. The minds in society remain separate. Their separate-

ness bears some resemblance to the separateness of the memory-systems in dissociation ; but it is unique.

The strength of the idealist conception of society rests upon its allusiveness. It carries with it a reference to vague experiences of contact in which the divisions and distinctions of "mere" thinking disappear ; and as opposed to the crude individualism of the nineteenth century, the idealist position is strong. Minds are not separate in exactly the same way as bodies are. Another more important reason for idealism is the reference it makes to the difficulty of finding exact and complete distinctions in reality. Realists have, indeed, seemed to imply that because one mind is not another, therefore any one can easily tell whether he is in the presence of one mind or two. But that is by no means always easy.

The perfect continuity of reality is not always given due prominence in the Realist philosophy, although both Alexander and Whitehead make special reference to this aspect of facts. In the legitimate desire to preserve their sense of the distinction between "this" and "the other," some realists tend to forget that of any particular it may be very difficult and perhaps impossible to say whether it belongs to this or the other class. A man is not a monkey, but of any given specimen it may be impossible to say which it is. This does not, however, imply that it is both or neither, as the idealists would argue ; for every series is infinite and there is no *last* member of an infinite series nor any *first* member of the enclosing series. Two minds are not one, even if we may not be able to say of any experience whether it is the experience of one mind or of two. If the metaphor may be allowed, two minds "shade into" one as a

monkey "shades into" a man ; and the difference between one mind and two may be only like the difference between $1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \dots + \frac{1}{n}$ and the next "whole" number 2. Even the categories of psychology are difficult to apply to facts. Enjoyment is at one end, contemplation at the other. Enjoyment gradually approaches contemplation in which "the object" arises. Being passes into being known, and of some items in experience it may be impossible to say whether they are being or being known. The continuity of the series is perfect and it is an infinite series. But the factors of reality which are the members of one series or another remain definitely separate.

CHAPTER VI

ULTIMATE VALUES

ONE aspect of joint enjoyment seems specially to unite minds, namely that in reference to which is given the awareness of ultimate values. It is necessary, therefore, to examine further the experience of ultimate values in order to make still clearer the character of the enjoyment in which the existence of other minds is discovered.

It has been already shown that beauty, truth, and goodness are realities which are perceived especially in the contact between minds. The adjectives true, good, and beautiful are such that, in perceiving the presence of what they indicate in an object, the perceiver is specially or intimately in contact with other minds. This, however, clearly cannot mean that some objects are objects for one mind in isolation ; for we know of no such mind. All minds of which we have any experience or evidence are in contact with other minds ; and as proved above, it is an illegitimate use of abstraction to speak of that which makes all minds to be what they are as though it were itself a mind.

One of the characteristics of mind is that it is related to others of the same order. There is a class of minds, and the members of the class affect one another by contact. In some cases the contact is not

The common distinction between minds certainly has a close connection with the distinction between bodies. "One body, one mind" is a common-sense philosophy; and whatever *other* distinctions exist between minds, this at least is one, that each refers to or is connected with a distinct section or series of material and contemplated events called a body.

Now this particular kind of difference between minds and of relation between those in contact is closely connected with the perception of sense-data. My sense-data differ from yours because of the position and other relations of my body. The penny which appears to me round (and is really round) appears to you in another position or to me in that other position to be oval (and is really oval). It is the position of my body and of yours which makes the penny appear differently to each of us. Possibly we may say that minds in contact in reference to sense-data are "more separate" than when they are in contact in reference to objects which are not sense-data. But it would be safer to say, not that they are more or less separate, but that their distinction and relation in this case are peculiar. The peculiarity which distinguishes the perception of sense-data from the perception of number or from the perception of beauty is that the difference between minds seems to be more obvious and fundamental in the perception of sense-data.

Turn now to the observation of scientific objects such as "matter" or atoms. Whereas the shape of the penny really differs in reference to the position of the observer, the atomic structure of matter does not so vary. The position and perhaps some other qualities or relations of the percipient seem to be irrelevant in regard to the physical or scientific char-

acteristics of observed facts. Hence the tendency to say that these are more real than the data of sense. They seem to be more truly in the objects, as the so-called "primary" qualities seemed to be when compared with "secondary" qualities. But of course, so far as any object is vitiated or subjectivised by being known or perceived, these scientific elements of fact or even that incorrect summary of them called by Descartes "extension," are just as much vitiated as the sense-data. Extension no less than colour appears to a percipient ; and if what appears is not what really exists, then extension does not exist "outside the mind." That, however, need not be discussed here.¹ The important point is that the distinction between sense-data (as appearances or reality) and scientific objects (as appearances or reality) is closely connected with differences between two kinds of contact between minds. In regard to sense-data, minds are referred to the distinction between bodies ; but in regard to scientific objects, the position of the percipient is irrelevant. It is commonly assumed that the so-called essential characteristics of matter are to be found in nature, whether green or red appears or whatever secondary qualities are present.

The percipient, however, must have *some* position. From *any* position the observed world of "nature" is seen to be spatial and temporal, but it must be so from *some* position. That is to say, scientific objects are perceived by reference to a percipient who may have any position. Such a percipient is, as it were, the impartial spectator or standard ; and his objects are those which are perceived in spite of or without

¹ I take it that Berkeley has shown, once for all, that primary qualities have no more "objectivity" than have secondary qualities.

regard to the fact that he is in fact also in *this* place and not in that. There is, of course, no such person as an impartial spectator ; but any man may be, in one sense or at one moment, impartial. The differences of mind from mind seem to be less important or obvious when we refer to scientific objects, as they are certainly less bodily ; and so we may metaphorically say that minds are in closer contact when they perceive these than when they perceive sense-data. The bodies seem to hold the minds less completely apart than in the perception of sense-data.

If we turn now to the tertiary quality or value named beauty, we find that it is assumed in common language to be in the same perceived world as that in which we find greenness or extension. That is to say, physical objects or factors of nature can be called beautiful. But whereas sense-data differ in respect to the position of the percipient and "scientific" factors appear to "a" mind or the mind which is neither mine nor yours but may be either, beauty appears to make the percipient always refer to the actual or possible presence of another percipient in contact with him. Thus when I see that an object is beautiful, my perceiving seems to change not only my relation to the object but also my relation to you. In some cases in which the beautiful is also the desirable there may be a very acute sense of the presence of other minds. In the case of "scientific" factors of nature the differences between the points of view of the percipients may be irrelevant. Matter is extended, however you look at it. The minds are thus not held apart but not held together ; but in the perception of beauty they seem to be actually brought into closer contact. Thus the perception of beauty in music brings men together ;

and being with a person greatly moved by beauty does move another person. This presence of one mind to another is, as indicated above, a form of enjoyment.

Indeed it seems as if the perception of beauty as well as the creation of beauty in art is essentially social; because the great periods of art have been precisely those in which the social consciousness was highly developed, and the individualistic periods have been periods of decadence in art or of submergence of the sense of beauty. Thus fifth-century Athens had an intense social life and a great art; fifteenth-century Florence had a similar concurrence: but nineteenth-century London combined individualism with barbarism,—successful adventurers with bad painting and architecture. The critical estimate of art is, however, too ambiguous to be used as an obvious proof of the fact that in the perception of beauty the near presence of other minds is given. It is enough for the argument here if there is some connection between social life and artistic production; but this is clearly a contradiction of the theory that art is more individual than social.

The other tertiary qualities or values are not to be found in natural or physical objects. Truth is a quality of propositions and goodness is a quality of character or conduct, except in so far as the goodness of *means* is concerned. The perception of these, then, is quite different from the perception of nature. Logical entities are not perceived with the senses, nor are moral realities. Now in so far as the senses do distinguish or divide the minds whose activities they are, we may metaphorically say that the minds are less divided or more closely in contact when they do not use their

senses. This is the ground for Aristotle's suggestion that *νοῦς* is one in all men.

But by considering truth somewhat more closely, it is seen that truth is connected with the contact between minds. We discover what we mean by truth when we observe disagreement, when two contradictory statements are present to the mind. And normally the contradiction is between propositions towards which two or more minds have the same attitude of belief. But what is important about truth is that it constrains; so "*praevalabit*." The quality of propositions which is their truth (whatever else it is or however we define truth) is at least that quality which unites minds to which those propositions are present. The other qualities, for example, having two terms or being disjunctive, do not seem to imply any reference to the mind's attitude towards other minds; but truth seems to mean that what I must believe, you must believe.

It is a commonplace that the distinction between illusion and reality has some connection with the contrast between what is peculiar to the isolated individual and what is socially common. For example, common sense generally recognises that, if I say there are rats running up the wall, I am likely to be under an illusion, unless several other people also see the rats. It is not denied that, when I say (without intent to deceive) "there are rats on the wall," I actually do have rats present to me as objects. There is no appeal against "subjective" experience. What is denied is that there are "real" rats, which means rats that other percipients can see. It is, no doubt, a crude test; for illusion can be common to many, as certain conjurors have proved. But that there is "something in it" as a test hardly any one will deny. Another

method of expressing the same test is to appeal to a normal or standard man. Illusion is what appears to one who is not normal ; and of course this may be simply tautology, for being normal may mean nothing but "not under an illusion." It is, however, possible that "normal" also means in the usual or indeed essential relations to environment. Now the usual relation to environment is social or common to more than one. In both cases, then, as excluding illusion and as expressing the normal, the presence of other minds in contact seems to be closely connected with the distinction of truth from error.

Goodness also seems to be socially perceived. That which is good as a means, for example, food or conversation, is good by reference to that which is ultimately or intrinsically good : and it is generally agreed that this is what is called morally good in character and conduct. As Bradley showed in his *Ethical Studies*, the Kantian epigram "Nothing is good but the good will" is too exclusive or too abrupt ; but it remains true that the goodness with which ethics is concerned is the goodness of "states of mind" or rather of mental or psychical activities of "will." Now all these activities are good or bad in reference primarily to contact with the activities of "other" persons. There is no morality which is not social. Rights and duties obviously have a reference to "other" minds ; and therefore the awareness of goodness is intimately connected with the contact of minds, which is distinguished from the contact of mind and objects as a contact within enjoyment.

A further peculiarity of values seems to connect them specially with the contact between minds. By contrast with other adjectives, the adjectives of value

have opposites—"false," "evil," and "ugly," which are more than merely contradictory. That is to say, there is in existence *un-value* as well as non-value: there is a *minus* as well as a *plus*. The language of estimation does not end with a mere negation: it contains a reference to privation. No metaphors should be allowed to obscure this fact. It should not be possible to dismiss the problem by saying that falsehood or error is "merely" deficient truth, or that evil is the "shadow of good," or that ugliness is a "sort of beauty." These three terms, false, evil, and ugly, refer to certain definite factors or elements in reality; and they may fairly be called privative factors as contrasted with negative factors.

Other adjectives, however, have no such opposites. Yellow is not opposed by blue or any other colour; and not-yellow is not an opposite in the same sense as "false" is the opposite of "true." Not-yellow is, as it were, yellow-at-zero, not *minus*-yellow. It is merely negative and is not privative. Similarly adjectives which refer to "scientific" reality, such as "atomic," have no negative opposites. The adjective non-atomic does not imply that its subject could be and is not atomic, but is applicable only to non-material reality. So also of spatial extension. Its opposite is just zero-space, not a *minus* space.

The adjectives of un-value, however, seem to imply, if not definitely to mean, that their subjects *can be but are not* qualified by the positive value in question. Thus when we say that a book is blue we do not mean that it could be yellow but is not: again, when we say that a mind is non-atomic we do not mean that it could be atomic but is not. When, however, we say that a statement is false, we mean that it *could be*

true but is not ; and we mean nothing more. Similarly when we say that any element in reality is evil or ugly we mean that it could be but is not good or beautiful. This is, indeed, all we mean, but it is a very great amount of meaning. Thus false and evil and ugly are not mere zero, but are actually *minus* true and good and beautiful. The realm of values, so to say, has no final term. The series has no including or comprehending series.

All this is quite familiar to philosophers, but what is its connection with the contact of minds ? It should be noticed that in the contact of minds, and not in other contacts, we have an example of similar privative opposites. For example, in contrast with co-operation there is conflict, in contrast with love there is hate, and in contrast with intellectual agreement there is disagreement. The relation between minds, which is named by the word conflict or hate or disagreement, is not a mere absence of co-operation, love or agreement. It is a privative opposite. As the positives co-operation, agreement, and love make of the contact of minds what is called society or community, so the privatives conflict, disagreement, and hate definitely *unmake* it. The result, then, is not a mere absence of community but its destruction or the destruction of its possibility. These privatives imply not merely that there is not community in this case but that there *could be and is not*. There is also some ground for saying that the positive values are discovered in the positive contacts of minds and the unvalues in the privative oppositions of minds which are nevertheless somehow in contact. Attraction and repulsion occur in the contact of minds, and the flash of either illumines either value or unvalue. Evil is shown up by conflict, ugliness by hate, and

falsehood by disagreement. All adjectives are given to minds in contact, as it has been shown above ; but the range of difference in the contact of minds, marked by the distinction between agreement and disagreement, co-operation and conflict, does not seem to affect the givenness of "yellow" or "atomic." It is then because minds are in contact in these peculiar ways that goodness, truth, and beauty are seen by them.

Adjectives which refer to sense are "in" the objects or "of" the objects. The yellow or green of the tree is really in the tree and not in the perceiving mind ; and the same is true of the beauty of the tree, the truth of a proposition or the goodness of an act. The greenness of the tree, however, is not in exactly the same position (as an adjective) as the beauty of the tree ; and so all adjectives of value seem to differ from other adjectives. This distinction is stated by Moore in the following way. The predicate "yellow" is the name of an intrinsic property ; but the predicate "beautiful" is *not* the name of an intrinsic property, although it does "depend only on the intrinsic nature (? properties) of what possesses it."¹ Moore, however, when he wrote this was not certain of the character of this difference between the realities to which the two kinds of predicate refer. He wrote—"What the difference is, if we suppose, as I suppose, that goodness and beauty are *not* subjective and that they do share with 'yellowness' and 'containing pleasure' the property of depending *solely* on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them, I confess I cannot say. I can only vaguely express the kind of difference I feel there to be by saying that intrinsic

¹ *Philosophical Studies*, chapter viii. "The Conception of Intrinsic Values," p. 273.

properties seem to *describe* the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do."

It is argued here that the distinction is that between (a) what appears to "a" mind and so to "the mind" in general, disregarding the contact between minds, and (b) what appears only to minds conscious of contact with other minds. The necessity then that "if x and y possess different intrinsic properties, their nature must be different" is a necessity of the relation to mind; and "the necessity of a different kind," namely "that if x and y are of different intrinsic values their nature must be different" is a necessity of the relation to minds in contact. But if this is so, Moore's conception of intrinsic nature will probably have to be extended; and it may be that Aquinas was more exact in his *Opusculum* "*De ente et essentia*." For if the enjoyment of minds in contact is merely a method of perceiving, there is no ground for denying that the predicate of value refers to an intrinsic property or to the intrinsic nature of what possesses it; although some properties and the natures of things in one sense do not include values. The sense, however, in such a case is similar to the sense in which we may say that it is "the nature" of a material object to be atomic. The essence of a thing, its intrinsic properties or its "nature"—these are words and phrases with many meanings; and in one sense it *is* the nature or essence of what is beautiful to be beautiful. Of course, this does not imply that it is always and from every point of view beautiful, just as a tree may not be always green; but when a thing is beautiful, it is its nature or essence or intrinsic property which thus appears and is real.

So far in this chapter the contact between one mind and another has been discussed as if these minds were necessarily the minds of distinct persons ; but it will be remembered that above, in Chapter V., it was shown that the unity of the self normally includes some distinctions between a person at one moment and the same person at another moment. When, therefore, minds in contact are said to be specially a source of the perception of ultimate values, we must allow for the possibility that such values may be perceived in the felt contrast between myself now and myself at a former time. The joint enjoyment implied in contemplating values may be the kind of joint enjoyment which makes me one person in many different moods or times. Thus I may perceive truth by "enjoying" my own former error, as well as by "enjoying" the error of other persons. This, however, should not be taken to imply that there are within me normally many minds ; or that the contrast between one mind and another is essentially the same as the contrast between my mind at one time and at another. That possibility has already been dismissed above.

Thus, even if sometimes the perception of ultimate values is due to the felt contrast *within* me, normally and generally that perception seems to be due to the contact between distinct persons. In both cases the perception would be in some sense social ; for, as Plato has indicated in the argument of the *Republic*, each so-called individual is, in some sense, a society. But confusion may result if the distinction between persons is obscured because of its likeness to distinctions within a single person ; especially as in all probability the felt distinctions within a person are later in development than the joint enjoyment which unites different

persons. It remains, therefore, the safest plan to emphasise, in explaining the perception of ultimate values, the contact between one mind and another, in the usual sense of those words.

There is an unexamined *idolon theatri* in regard to the perception of values which may be an obstacle to the understanding that adjectives of value are intrinsic or objective. It is the superstition that other kinds of mental experience are in some way derivative from sense-perception, which is further understood to mean the perception of what are called sense-data. This seems to imply that the data of experience are "impressions," as Hume said, which do not contain the essentials of space and time and presumably still less contain the essentials of beauty or truth or goodness. We are supposed on this hypothesis to conclude that there is infinite space and time and, presumably, ultimate value from some other evidence, not that of external or non-mental data: and Hume was quite right in concluding, on this hypothesis, that what did not come from the data of experience was in some sense illusory. He said, indeed, that it came from the mind: but how could what came from the mind apply in any way to that world known by impressions, which *ex hypothesi* was not the mind? If the infinite space-time and the tertiary qualities or values are not given, then they must be in some way made; and if they are made, they are fictions.

Kant saw the difficulty; but he seems to have tried to avoid it by plunging more deeply into the original error. He seems to say that those facts which do not come from the non-mental world are the mind itself in contact with that non-mental world and that there is no world except this complex. Thus he tried to

avoid Hume's conclusion, but he accepted Hume's mistaken assumption that the infinity of space and time and the ultimate values were not found outside the mind : and the result was that he infected, not only space and time and value with psychic additions, but *the whole of experience*. Only half of Hume's world was illusory or fictitious ; but the whole world of Kant seems to be so. Kant, of course, allows that phenomena are not conditions precedent to experience, since, he strongly asserts that the characteristics of mind are always present ; and therefore the perception of beauty may be as primitive as the perception of colour. But he implies this conclusion only at the cost of subjectivising the whole of the data.¹ This rendering, however, of an ancient controversy should not distract the attention of the reader here. There may be other views of the doctrines of Hume and Kant. It is perhaps possible to interpret Kant as if he meant that all fact is objective and in no way "subjective." The particular point of importance here, however, is that the older tradition seems to assume that in experience sense-data come first and the qualities of space and time appear afterwards. Of course, from the point of view of the substance having qualities, the order is reversed, and primary qualities are regarded as more essential than secondary ; but in most philosophies the process of abstraction is supposed to be necessary for the appearance of spatial and temporal factors in experience. And it is further supposed that only after a considerable development of mental process is there a perception of beauty, truth, and goodness.

¹ It is implied above, in Chapter I., that the infinity of space-time as well as ultimate values are given as objective data to the mind and that Hume omitted one aspect of impressions.

It has been argued above, in Chapter II. on "Minds and Bodies," that the perception of mathematical reality is concomitant with the perception of sense-data and that the former is not derived from the latter.¹ But the same seems to be true of ultimate values. They are not given only to late and highly developed experience. The data of the experienced world, given and in no sense made, include (a) the ultimate values, (b) logical nexus, and (c) space, time, and "secondary" qualities. But we do not in logic or in natural development pass from the perception of sense-data to that of logical nexus and so finally to that of ultimate values. Both Hume and Kant have given too much status to sense-data in their analysis of the process of mental development; although if Kant really meant that the *noumena* are "given," then perhaps he may be said to have implied that value could be perceived as directly and in as primitive a stage as we perceive colour.

Even those who admit that value is objective, however, seem to imply generally that among the data of experience the obvious and so-called sensory qualities are perceived first and values afterwards. Or again, in regard to values which are not found in "nature," such as the truth of propositions and the goodness of acts, it is implied that the meaning of the proposition or the personal source of the act is perceived before their values. Thus the objectivity of values still seems to leave them in a secondary or derivative position, so far as the percipient is concerned. This, however, is probably a mistake which is due in part to the survival of the traditional status of sense-data or phenomena, in the ordinary non-Kantian sense, in the minds even of those philosophers who have shaken off most of the

¹ See above, p. 25.

ancient superstitions. Indeed why should one suppose that sense-data come first or that we see or are aware of the colour of an object *before* perceiving its beauty? Why should values come last and not first in experience, whether the order be that of logic or of nature?

The contact of minds is more intimate in the earliest period of the life of mind, whether in the race or in the individual. Therefore if intimacy of contact between minds gives awareness of values, this awareness *précèdes* the awareness of sense-data. And if, following our hypothesis, we reverse the order of the traditional description of experience, the result seems quite valid as a description of real consciousness. We should then state the facts as follows.

In nature and in logic, beauty is in awareness first, and then extension, and then, only at the third remove, the greenness of the tree. Similarly, goodness is in awareness first, then that there is an act, then that it is your act or mine. So also in the sphere of knowledge, in nature as well as in logic, propositions are "in awareness" first, then appear scientific objects, and then, thirdly, the sense-data from which we are supposed to abstract the other objects of knowledge. We know or are aware of the fact that one and one make two *before* we are aware that things are extended, and we are aware of both of these facts *before* we perceive colour. Of course, we are not at first aware *that* we are aware of number. We do not analyse what happens to us when we are children. The distinction between the awareness of number and the awareness of colour is not obvious to us in early life; but later on, when we philosophise, we observe that they are different, and perhaps we do so then by attending to sense-data

first. The philosophical process, however, may be the reversal of the growth of consciousness. This is perhaps what led Bergson to say that reasoning was a reversal of the life-process ; but it is not necessary to say that reasoning is only the reasoning of philosophers. Normal reasoning need not begin with sense-data. It may be said, however, that if the old-fashioned order was mistaken, its reversal is also mistaken, and that, in fact, we perceive truth and extension and colour *at the same time* or concomitantly. This may be so. It would not seriously affect our argument if it were so ; but it seems still more consonant with the argument to say that, mind being essentially minds-in-communication, those objects which are pre-eminently objects for minds in communication are perceived *first*, and only as the distinctions and divisions of minds become more complex do the other objects appear. When mind appears, is not by any means clear. The life, of course, of the human being begins with the mating of the gametes ; and mind may be present in the womb or it may be absent until some measurable time after birth. We cannot be certain that a human body is accompanied by a mind until communication occurs. Mind in this sense, however, must not be thought of as life *plus* something super-added to life ; for mind is a real whole within which there are activities identical with life which is not mental. Life may be thought of as a sort of defective mind—not mind as a completer life. The human body is human from its inception. It is not the body of a fish or a dog which later becomes human.

The reversal of the traditional explanation of the order of experience must not be misunderstood. It is *not* maintained that in every object its beauty is

perceived first, and in every proposition its truth, and in every act its goodness : for there may be objects in which there is no beauty or ugliness. That is to say, this adjective beautiful, or ugly, may not be applicable to some objects and in any case there are objects to which it is not in fact applied. It is not maintained, then, that every item of experience must be evaluated or that value must be found everywhere. The point is that of all the objects of the mind those attract attention first which have value and those qualities of the objects which are their tertiary qualities attract attention first. The further evidence on which this hypothesis must rest for proof is of course psychological ; and it is not proposed here to attempt psychological analysis. But enough has perhaps been said to show that the hypothesis is reasonable which implies that the perception of values is not a late and derivative development but a very primitive experience, and that this primitive experience is closely connected with the fact that minds are most intimately in contact with other minds in the earliest and simplest stages of life.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL UNITIES

THE fact of community or society is obvious ; and clearly there are many instances, such as states, churches, and associations of all kinds. To facts of this kind Plato and Aristotle referred when they wrote of the πόλις ; and to the same kind of facts modern social theory refers in such terms as the group-mind, the trade union, and the rest. The analysis of what may be called the internal structure of these facts is given in the science of politics, in economics and other such studies ; but philosophy is concerned chiefly with the character of such realities with respect to or by reference to factors in experience of which social theorists take no account. If a community or a society is actual, how is it “ placed ” with regard to a mind or an individual, and also with regard to “ logical ” entities such as number or natural law ? That would seem to be a reasonable question to ask in pursuing the study of the contact between minds. For the argument so far seems to rest the whole weight of the explanation of social life upon the word “ between ”—and therefore makes society merely a relation of minds in contact.

This seems to imply philosophical individualism ; and it is certainly opposed to any theory that social unities are higher or more real than the unity of the

self. But the contact between minds should not be taken to imply any dependence of the society so formed upon the minds in contact. Those philosophers are right who say that the minds in society are not 'more real or more independent than the society, although they are wrong in implying that the society is more real than its members. It is impossible as a compromise to maintain that both the minds and the society are dependent in the same sense, each upon the other ; for the *relation* between the minds in contact is the society and the minds are not the society, since any mind may belong to any society although it must belong to some society.

The actual facts of social experience, however, are often so interpreted that the distinct minds in the contact of minds seem to lose their separateness ; and the " real " is said to be an individuality which is a whole, inclusive of many finite minds. Bosanquet writes as follows :—

So individuality, the principle of reality and the consistent whole, takes us beyond personality in the strict sense, beyond the consciousness of self which is mediated by an opposing non-self, into the region where we go out of self and into it by the same movement, in the quasi-religion of social unity, in knowledge, art, and in religion proper.¹

This seems to mean that in social units this self and the other no longer exist, when you " go out and in " at the same time and, like Alice in the looking-glass, you turn your back on self only to find that you are still walking towards it. What this " it " is may be quite different from mind in contact with mind, with which we are here concerned ; but

¹ Bosanquet, *Individuality*, p. 270.

Bosanquet seems to mean that there is no distinction, at some mysterious stage or moment in development, between the minds in contact and the social unity.

Again he says that "it seems a mistake to push (the doctrine opposed) so far as to deny that the State is a name for a special form of self-transcendence in which individuality strongly anticipates the character of its perfection."¹ This must mean that the State subsumes the minds of its members; and in the attempt to make the State a reality, it destroys the independent reality of its members.

The reason for supposing that the members of a society, or the minds in contact, are what they are solely because of their contact is perhaps of this kind. These contacts make a difference. When I enter into communication with you, I change and you change. Both of us are different from what we were before. If a third person were to meet me before and after I had had the communication, he would, or at least, if he knows me, he *should*, notice the difference in me. The "I" of before-communication no longer exists, although something of what was before still exists, or there would be no meaning to the words "making a difference" and "change." It is concluded, therefore, that that which is the same is the reality within which we communicate or without which we could not communicate, that is the *community* of me and you. The evidence, however, can be rendered adequately in other terms as follows: The "I" of before-communication has *not* ceased to exist. Of course, if you mean by the "I" of before-communication *only* that which has *not* changed, then indeed, since there has been change,

¹ Bosanquet, *Individuality*, p. 316.

that has ceased to exist. "What was" is not "what is." Past is not present. But the identity to which we refer as "I" is a unity of continuity. The amount and kind of unity may be questionable, but there is some unity; and that unity is much more truly called "I" than it is called society or community. The I which is affected, then, by contact is a complex unity formed by a distinct memory system. It is the same because the character of the series remains the same, although new items or elements are added to the series by contact with other minds.

But an opponent may say that the unity of the self is the unity of society. The society is its members. Each member is a "moment" in the life of the "whole." The change which takes place "in me" is the change "of" society. If, however, this means that when we say "I change" and "society changes" we are referring to identically the same fact, it seems clearly false. There is a distinction which we find in experience; and we express one element so distinguished in one way and the other in another. And—more important still—I distinguish my changing from your changing. Whatever may be true of our community, I am not part of you, nor can the change of either of us in contact be rendered *fully* in the terms of the other. What has happened to me cannot be fully explained by reference to you only. We do not cease to be units when we are at one in communication. The unity of a community or society, therefore, does not explain or subsume or include the unity of a member of that community. These are two quite distinct kinds of unity.

Put into the language which has been used in this book, the facts to which reference is made seem to

be these. The enjoyment of *our* experience is less obtrusive, less frequent, and less continuous than the enjoyment of *my* experience. But if we continue to speak of contact *between* minds, we seem to imply that the unity and continuity of each mind is superior to or more real than the unity and continuity of the contact. Now the mere fact that the contact is less continuous than, say, the contact between myself to-day and myself yesterday, does not show that it is less important or less real. What exists for a moment may be more significant than what exists for centuries. The intensity of an experience gives more evidence than the time it occupies ; and this intensity is the reality to which Meredith refers when he says of Colour :—

Thy fleetingness is bigger in the ghost
Than Time with all his host.

Why not, then, say that society is the real fact and not the separate minds ? Why give a substantiality to the minds and make society a mere relation ? Why not say that the *life of mind* is substantial, and not the mere terms of a relation within that life ? The individual is what he is because of his contacts in society : why, then, seem to make society dependent for its existence on the individuals formed by it ? The difficulty seems to be due to the use of the word “ between ” or to the idea of relation. The supposed “ higher ” unity of community is invoked to save community from being what is called a “ mere ” relation and so being insubstantial. But the contrast between substance and relation is by no means so absolute as is implied in this theory. The mind which is in contact with another is a substance because it is a unity of continuous experiences of conation, cognition, and

emotion. This mind is sometimes said to be not the mere relation *between* the experiences, but the experiences so related.¹ And there is a sense in which each experience is substantial, for each exists in itself and not in another. The experience of thinking is not the same as the experience of hating ; nor is either so included in a substance as to be dependent for its existence upon it. A mind is in some sense a relation and its states or acts are not qualities inhering in it, but this does not seem to make the mind insubstantial. To suppose that it does is to exaggerate the insubstantiality of relations.

On the other hand some philosophers tend to exaggerate the substantiality of elements in experience which are not social, either the experiences of thinking and conation, or the soul substances. It is recognised, of course, that substance cannot be transcendent or outside of the world perceived, as Locke seems to have thought the traditional conception of substance implied. Laird in his *Problems of the Self* rightly shows that a substance which does not actively co-ordinate its qualities is useless.² And Locke very properly suspected substance which was simply a name for the fact that certain qualities or ideas are found together. What keeps them together is the true substance ; but, as Laird argues, this is not another reality of the same order as the qualities. It begins, in fact, to have the character of a relation. The general character of substance in nature as well as in mind need not be discussed here. But when we consider that particular kind of substance which is self or soul, it seems to be still more obviously relational. There is nothing, as

¹ So apparently in Laird's *Problems of the Self*.

² This is admirably stated in M'Taggart's *Nature of Existence*, section 66 sq.

Hume showed, which underlies and, as an external force, holds together the states of mind, the thoughts and other mental experiences—nothing, except what Hume omitted to notice, their relation. And why should this relation not be substantial?

The only possible reason for avoiding the term relation in regard to the soul substance seems to be some confusion of relation with attributes or qualities of a substance. Now Laird seems to be undecided whether everything not substantial is an attribute. On the one hand he says: "A substance is not merely the unity of its attributes, because any substance must also contain some element of stuff or *ὕλη*, but the problem of its *identity* is that of the unity of attributes in that which occupies time."¹ On the other hand—" . . . experiences are real. . . . They are substances having stuff in them. They exist and, as we have shown, they cannot be regarded as mere qualities of anything else. . . . But . . . they are not self-existent substances. They must exist as parts of a unity, and the existence of all of them in a unity through time *is* the soul, the psychical substance. . . . But the soul is neither an aggregate of experiences in themselves loose and disconnected, nor is it a unity of qualities. It is a unity of experiences; and there must be a soul, because it is part of the being of any experience to form part of such a unity."² The phrase "the existence of experiences . . . in a unity *is* the soul" is somewhat ambiguous; but Laird seems to mean that the connection of psychic experiences with their "soul" is not that of attributes or qualities with a substance. Why not, then, boldly say that they are terms of the *relation* which is the soul? Clearly

¹ *Problems of the Self*, p. 354.

² *Ibid.* p. 360.

because it is thought that the substantiality of the soul would thereby be imperilled.

And so when we come to consider the contact between minds, the individual remains a hard and irreducible substance. "The individual finite centre of experience exists on its own account. . . . The self requires society, but it is an independent member of society. . . . We know what our souls are, we know the meaning of their identity. They are not disconnected with other things or with other personalities, and they may be part of a wider spiritual whole. But so long as they exist they dare not relinquish one tittle of their meaning."¹ The tendency of these phrases is to put aside the problem of the contact of minds ; but so far as it is noticed, society seems to be considered somewhat insubstantial by comparison to the human soul, which is said to be "the best example of a distinct and independent substance." Laird seems to be terrified lest the soul may dissolve under his eyes if he says it is a relation ; but he does not seem to care whether society is a relation of souls ; and yet the unity and identity of a social whole is quite obvious. The finite centre of experience is given a substantiality which is not given to the contact of minds in a society : but it is perhaps equally possible to explain a mind and a society as "centres of experience" relational in character and yet subsisting independently of any substratum or support.

The Scholastic doctrine of the Trinity is interesting in this regard. Aquinas and the later scholastics agreed that the Persons of the Trinity were "subsistent relations," that is to say they were "ad aliquid" without being "in aliquo." The character of the

¹ Laird, *op. cit.* pp. 363, 364.

Absolute, to put the idea into modern language, was said by them to be such that in regard to it the contrast between substance and relation did not hold.¹ The Whole or Universe or God does not consist of nodules of fact (substances), with connections between them : but in contrast with Spinoza who dropped the connections, the scholastics seem to drop the substances. What is most fundamental to them is relatedness, not identity. That, however, is a long story.

The next stage was reached when Ockham dealt with the conception of substance. He says that the substance of physical existence is "quantitas,"² and of the supposed immaterial, incorruptible form, the soul, he says : "No such form is known by evidence from experience ; nor can we know thus (*i.e.*, otherwise than by "revelation" or theology) that the understanding which belongs to such a substance is in us nor that such a soul is the form of the body." What we know by evidence of experience is the states of mind in relation.³ Thus what had been a hypothesis

¹ Thomas Aquinas, *S. Theol.*, "relatio realiter existens in Deo est idem essentiae secundum rem," i. q. xxviii. art. 2. "Persona divina significat relationem ut subsistentem. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum substantiae," i. q. xxiv. art. 4.

The comparison between the Trinity and the human mind is made in the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (Bk. i. dict. 3), which is of course the basic book for scholasticism. It is worth noting that one of the propositions of Peter Lombard which was condemned later is that the affection I have for others is the Holy Spirit. The relations in Peter Lombard are (1) memory, (2) knowledge, and (3) will or affection.

² *De sacramento altaris*, passim, "non est substantia nisi quantitas et qualitas." Cf. Alexander, *Space, Time*, i. p. 29: "We enjoy ourselves as permanent amid our changes : that is, our mind is in its own enjoyment a substance. It enters into relations within itself as well as with external things. Its processes have at least intensity : they have that species of quantity."

³ Ockham, *Quotlibeta* i. quaestio x. The reason why we cannot prove the soul substance to exist is because "solum experimur intellectiones et volitiones et similia." This is one of the passages in which Ockham remarks that Aristotle's statements are no concern of his.

in regard to the Whole, is now a hypothesis applicable to the finite self or mind.

The point of special interest here is the applicability of this idea of subsistent relation to the contact between minds in society. The relatedness of the factors of fact has already been noticed in the preliminary chapter above. Here it is necessary to concentrate attention upon that particular form of relatedness between minds in contact which seems to be made too substantial by idealists and too adjectival by realists.

If society is the contact between minds, the "between" must be understood in this case to refer to a quite special kind of relation which may be called subsistent. But first it should be clear that the "between" does not make society an adjective or quality of the minds which are members of society.

We are obsessed with the adjectival relation ; and Logic has certainly over-rated its importance. Thought is much more subtle and follows reality much more closely than the traditional Logic seems to imply ; but even our thinking is too much dominated by the presence of adjectives or qualities. That particular kind of reality which is quality is referred to when we say, for example, that the tree is green or that it has greenness : but it is *not* referred to when we say either (a) that the tree is here or that the anger is now, or (b) that "this is the tree." Now qualities may all be relational,—we need not discuss that problem here ; but relations are certainly not all qualitative or adjectival. For example, it is nonsense to say that the tree has "hereness" or even "position in space" and still more clearly nonsense to say that "thisness has the tree." Position in space is, of course, as M'Taggart would say, a characteristic of the tree ; but it no

more "belongs" to the tree than to the rest of the spatial world which is not the tree. It has a status quite different from the greenness of the tree. Again the denotation by which the tree is made present to the mind is not a quality of the tree ; but it may be, if there can be such a reality, a relation of identity. Relations are in no sense possessed. They are not properties.¹

• The difficulty in explaining the reality which is the contact of minds perhaps arises from a mistaken assimilation of qualities and relations. A quality or accident or property inheres in or is attached to or is dependent upon a substance, which is therefore conceived as underlying or supporting its qualities. A quality, as it were, looks inward : but a relation looks outward. This is perhaps why Moore distinguishes relational properties from relations ; for clearly there is a distinction between what "belongs" to the substance and what "belongs" just as much to what is precisely *not* the substance.² Relation, as the scholastics would say, is "ad aliquid" not "in aliquo" : but all qualities are "in aliquo."

Relation, then, having no dependence or inherence, such as qualities or attributes have, is not contradistinguished from or opposed to substance in the same way as they are. It is, as again the scholastics would say, subsistent. It stands by itself and, so far as this goes, it is substantial ; but, of course, it is not substantial in every sense of that term, since it is not a substratum or support of qualities only. Relation,

¹ This is in partial agreement with M'Taggart's argument in *The Nature of Existence*, section 81 sq. : "The conception of 'between' is as ultimate as the conception of 'in.'"

² Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, "Internal and External Relations," p. 282 sq.

however, has this additional characteristic of substance that it "supports" its terms. Qualities do not in any sense support their substance; for they, as it were, have no strength of their own. Relation, on the other hand, not only can stand on its own feet but can also hold up its terms. All relations have this character.

All relations, then, have a peculiar status in reality which prevents their being subordinated to substance; and it is not true that "*quaelibet res vel in se vel in alio est*," if "*res in se*" means substance only. Spinoza was wrong. But there are some relations which hold of contemplated objects and others of enjoyed realities. The relation of contemplated objects is not subsistent, because it is not itself a bearer of qualities. Position in space has no greenness; but a State has power.

Again, of the relations of enjoyed reality there are two kinds, one of which is the relation of enjoyment to contemplated reality in knowledge, conation, and feeling directed towards objects. The relation in knowledge is not subsistent because it has no distinctions such as to give its terms distinctness one from the other. Hence knowing is sometimes described as compresence: and compresence is indeed a relation, but one which, so to speak, unites without dividing. The other relation of enjoyed reality is that which occurs within enjoyment and is the relation of minds in contact. This pre-eminently is subsistent; but it is clearly similar to that relation, also within enjoyment, which unites distinct mental processes in "a" mind.

The connection of the member-minds with a society (their subsistent relation) is not quite the same as the connection of the distinct mental experiences with a mind (which is *their* subsistent relation). But in both

cases the connection is similar in *not* being a connection of qualities with a substance, in the sense that the qualities green, high, and the rest are connected with a substance, tree. Thinking is not a quality of a mind-substance, but is an element of a subsistent relation ; and so also you and I are not attributes of the state or society, but elements of a subsistent relation. A mind and a society are both "ad aliquid" ; but the "aliquid" is different in the two cases. The reality, then, of a social unit is relational, but not therefore insubstantial.¹ This unit does not consist of minds as part of a whole but as terms of a relation. These same minds, however, since relations are not "internal," have many other relations ; and it is only one of the many different relations which is here called subsistent. That is to say, the relation of a mind to an object in cognition or conation is not subsistent ; because cognition does not "support" the mind as communication does. Clearly this language is metaphorical ; but it is an attempt to show how the presence of one mind to another in social intercourse differs from the compresence of mind and object in cognition. The former appears to be more fundamental to the character of mind and is, as it has been suggested above, in the sphere of enjoyment. A mind may have many different kinds of relation to an object, for example, cognition differs from conation ; but it has only one kind of relation to "other minds in society," namely the joint enjoyment. This therefore is the relation we call subsistent. Relation, then, within the sphere of enjoyment is distinct from relation

¹ M'Taggart, *op. cit.* section 127 : "Since a group has qualities and stands in relations, and is not itself a quality or a relation, it is a substance." But a group is described as a *collection*, in section 120. Why not then a relation ?

within the sphere of contemplated reality and also from the relation between these two spheres. The relation of minds in enjoyment leaves them still centres of experience or subsistent relations of mental experiences. This relation, which has been called a "contact between," has the characteristics of enjoyed reality or enjoyment.

The contact, then, between minds, which is society, is indeed a relation, but not such a relation as makes the minds into attributes of the society or society into an attribute of the minds.

The general course of the argument so far may be summarised as follows : Two general types of "factor" can be distinguished and are in existence in "fact" : these are contemplated realities and enjoyed realities. The relations between these are various ; but, for philosophy and all other forms of knowledge, the most important relations are cognition and conation. Contemplated realities are inter-related, as well as in relation to enjoyed realities. This, however, in other terms and perhaps with some diffidence, is accepted by most philosophers and does not immediately concern the argument here. The study of either (*a*) the world of nature, or (*b*) mental process seems to have induced students of each to doubt the existence or the independent existence of the other ; but that again is another issue.

The argument here is concerned chiefly with enjoyed realities. The relation of these to contemplated reality or nature is *never* "individual" as opposed to "social." All mental process is a relation to contemplated reality of more than one mind in contact with other minds ; and this seems to be generally accepted by philosophers although psychologists tend still to

assume an individual mind as a preliminary or a fundamental to the investigation of "social psychology."

The further step which has been attempted above is in the analysis of enjoyed reality. It has been suggested that (a) the factors of fact, within this more inclusive factor, are mental states, acts, or processes. These may be further analysed: but whether relations or "items of experience," they are terms in the other relation which is called a self or a mind. Again, these selves or minds in contact are (b) factors of fact within realities called states, associations, and social unities generally: and analysis may go further in either direction, either distinguishing many selves, where before only one seemed to exist, or distinguishing types of social unity.

It is suggested, finally, that *all* relations *within enjoyed reality* can be distinguished from (a) all relations within contemplated reality and from (b) relations between enjoyed and contemplated reality. Relations within enjoyed reality, *i.e.* minds and minds-in-contact, are *subsistent relations*, and have thus connections rather with the class of substances than with the class of attributes.

One element in experience remains to be mentioned, which would probably make some philosophers say that the argument so far has not reached its legitimate conclusion, because it has not included a reference to the Absolute. Realists, indeed, have been too disrespectful to the Absolute. The element of actual experience in the contact of minds, as in other sections of fact, which is indicated by the idealist Absolute, seems to be the "ideal" element. It is seen in the fact that the relation between members of a class, or particulars of a universal, not only "keeps together"

the *actual* world but keeps it together with the *possible* which is not actual. The contact between minds refers beyond the actual and is not, in one sense, "complete," because it is a finite experience. It points towards completeness as an ideal ; and this, no doubt, is the ground for supposing that the individual mind in contact is the beginning of what is sometimes called a "concrete universal." The true individual is a complex of particular and universal, but the universal element is not entirely expressed in the actual. Again the relations of any "finite" mind, that is any mind we know, are infinite in two ways, for they are (a) actually infinite, in so far as what we know of a mind's relations is only an excerpt or selection of all its actual relations and they are (b) infinite possibilities, in so far as process or passage or *durée* is a reality and there will be more relations than there are or have been. It is, therefore, said that the mind in contact, in enjoyment or otherwise, is individual only so far as *all* its relations are included, that is to say, in so far as it is universalised and "concrete" ; because it is then no longer an excerpt, a selection, or an abstraction from fact.

Why is the concrete universal conceived to be in any way superior to or more real than a universal that is not concrete ? The term concrete seems to give to the term universal a stability and independence which it would otherwise lack ; and thus some philosophers suppose that they have secured better building material when they have something concrete.¹ This is significant. The reason for calling a certain type of reality a concrete universal is the same as the reason for which

¹ Cf. Bosanquet, *Individuality*, p. 289 : "The individual is a higher concrete than the body."

builders and architects give to one kind of material the name "concrete." The neo-Hegelians do not, indeed, feel confident of the reality of the actual; and they seek to give it stability, which it has not, by introducing into its structure the possible, which by definition it is not. These philosophers seem to think that the universal which is not "concrete" lacks something. It is strange but significant that they do not speak of the concrete particular. Their *idolon theatri* is apparent. They are biassed in favour of the universal; for they do not even attempt to build with particulars. Or is it that particulars are already "concrete"? It cannot be that, for the argument in favour of a concrete universal is not a reference to the particulars in which the universal has been actually found. The "defect" of these particulars, from the point of view of idealism, is that they are these and *not the others*; but that there are or may be others is implied in what we perceive to be their universal. That which in them unites these actual particulars also unites these to *possible* others as yet undefined, which do not or have not entered into any "finite" experience. It seems, then, that the concrete universal is the universal in or with all its *possible* particulars. That is why it is said to be more than a class name and to be the only possible basis for induction and to be not a mere resemblance of repetitions but a totality or a "real universe." Indeed it is obvious that reality, objectivity, and truth are more extensive or, if you will, less "finite" than existence.

The contact between minds is not the belonging to a class or being particulars of the universal mind. The difference that each mind makes to the other when in communication is not to be explained by relation to this

universal, since this relation holds in the case of minds which do not communicate. But there is a special universal which is implied as in some way uniting those minds which are in contact. Now, as the universal of existent or actual particulars does not make them one destroying their distinction, so the universal, which unites all actual to all possible particulars, does not destroy the distinction between the actual and the possible. For certain purposes, as for example, in induction and perhaps in all forms of inference, the distinction between (a) the universal actually experienced in *actual* particulars and (b) the universal in all *possible* particulars (including the unexperienced) may be unimportant or of subordinate importance ; but for the subject here in view, the character of mental contacts, this distinction is very important. Some actual minds are in contact. Of course, there will be, or at any rate there may be, other not-yet-actual minds to be in contact with those now or in the past communicating. Society lives on, although the minds of to-day disappear. Every mind in present contact is in this sense incomplete ; and since there is no ground for supposing that there is any limit to the number of possible contacts, each mind, when completed, is infinite. But the phrase "when completed" refers precisely to that distinction of actual and possible which is most important for the present argument. Of course, if by "mind" you mean "a mind in all possible relations," then indeed every mind is infinite, but so is everything else and mind is not peculiar in this. And even if by "mind" is meant anything so vague, the word must at least refer to actual minds in some sense or other. Now it is precisely this reference to actual minds which is distinct from the reference to

actual minds "in all possible relations." We do not know all the relations which any one mind will have and we do not know even all the relations which it now has or has had. The present itself is so full as to make it quite inexhaustible by knowledge, even without a reference to past or future. Therefore, in one sense, mind complete or universalised is not and cannot be known.¹ But mind thus complete and universalised is an *ideal limit*, not a point in a series. It is unreachable as the complete sum of an infinite series is unreachable. Mind, in that sense, is related to "a" mind as the number two is related to the sum of one *plus* all the fractions between one and two. The number two may be treated as equivalent to the sum of the series ; but in fact it is not identical with that sum. Now it is the sum which does not enter into knowledge, not the series or the elements of the series. The fact that "a mind in all possible relations" cannot be known is no argument against knowledge of a mind in an actual number of relations.

The actual is here and now and has many other qualities and relations ; but it is in fact not a rigid and rounded or limited reality. It refers to what is not actual, to other qualities and relations : and this "beyond" to the actual is real and exists in some

¹ The argument is well stated by Nicholas de Cusa in *De docta ignorantia*, and in the *Apologia* the possibility of exact knowledge is explained. "Quidditas est inattingibilis." On the other hand, "nec sequitur ex coincidentia oppositorum destructio seminis scientiarum, primi principii (i.e. the law of contradiction), nam illud principium est quoad intellectum discurrentem primum, sed nequaquam quoad intellectum videntem" (*Apol.*, fol. 39b). "The reach of the intellect is greater than its grasp." Cf. Whitehead, *Concept of Nature*, p. 14 : "The structure of the natural complex can never be completed in thought, just as the factors of fact can never be exhausted in sense-awareness. Inexhaustiveness is an essential character of our knowledge of nature. Also nature does not exhaust the matter for thought."

sense. It is said that only if we include all this is our account of the actual a true account.¹ But this does not follow. Of course our account is not a true account of "the beyond," but it is quite a true account of the actual; and the desire for an account of what is *not* the actual, in order to complete your account of the actual, is perhaps the source of that persistent irrelevancy from which some types of philosophy suffer. The inclusion of statements about all the relations which any factor of fact has *not*, is theoretically necessary for a complete account of all that it has; but such an account would not be an account of the same reality as is referred to by description of a selected number of relations. This selection is a finding of reality. These relations are there. This mind is in this society. And such statements are true enough, that is to say, absolutely true.²

But philosophy, in which are to be found perfectly true statements about distinct factors in fact, has never excluded a reference (of another kind) in every such statement to what is beyond this or that distinct factor. The relatedness of the real world is very well expressed in the allusiveness of language. Some philosophers desire to sacrifice this allusiveness of a phrase in order to secure the exactness of a formula; and it is significant that the monadist Leibniz was the advocate of a philosophical algebra. But, despite its penumbra of unexpressed reference, a word or a phrase is more useful in philosophy than a clear-cut S or P; for philosophy is in the main the study of precisely that

¹ There is "no point at which an arrest in the process can be justified . . . the passage from the contradictory and unstable in all experience alike to the stable and satisfactory" (Bosanquet, *Individuality*, p. 268).

² It will be perceived that I am using here some of the results of M'Taggart's work, *The Nature of Existence*.

relatedness which monadists either deny or introduce by a subterfuge. Thus every perfectly true statement is a centre with a penumbra of implications ; and in its definite reference it does not exclude or deny the fundamental relatedness of the fact to which it definitely refers. The statements about a mind or a contact between minds are of this kind : for mind in this characteristic has no superiority to or even dissimilarity from other elements of the real world. Therefore the reference to the actually known mind or contact of minds is quite different from the reference beyond such mind or contact.

The actual and the possible are not related as parts to a whole : and it is doubtful if even past and future ("is" or "was" and "will be") are parts of a whole. The universe or the All, whatever those words may mean, otherwise than in mythology, cannot reasonably be called a whole : but that is too large an issue to discuss here. As for those other supposed "wholes" which are to be found in "a mind in all possible relations" and other "concrete universals," it is not true that actual minds are parts along with minds-to-be of a whole Mind. The addition of an infinite to a finite does not make the finite infinite—whatever may happen in the older mathematics. But here we approach the connections of the argument we have so far followed with a more general theory of the real ; and that cannot be included in this book. What has been said in this matter is intended only to prevent the dissolution into absolute nothingness of the meagre deposits of truth which may result from the application to experience of a very limited hypothesis.

INDEX

- Activity, 24, 28
 Actual, 130
 Alexander, 14, 43, 62, 74, 75 *sq.*, 94,
 123 *n.*
 Aquinas, 19, 58, 107, 122
 Aristotle, 40, 57, 58
 Aveling, 25 *n.*
 Avenarius, 21, 51

 Beauty, 74, 96, 100
 Bergson, 3, 80, 82, 92, 113
 Berkeley, 51, 53
 Beyond, 133
 Body, 17 *sq.*, 48, 98
 Bosanquet, 116, 130 *n.*, 134 *n.*
 Bradley, 103
 Broad, 14

 Cause, 27 *n.*, 80
 Co-consciousness, 89
 Communication, 57, 62 *sq.*, 92, 117
 Community, 115
 Conation, 66
 Concrete universal, 130
 Consciousness, 81
 Contact, 67
 Contemplation, 85, 128
 Co-operation, 69
 Cusa, 133 *n.*

 Descartes, 20, 26, 36, 46, 99
 Dissociation, 88
 Duddington, 47 *n.*

 Emotion, 70
 Energy, 9
 Enjoyment, 14, 43, 79 *sq.*, 128
 Entelechy, 20

 Factors, 9, 128
 Feeling, 32, 70
 Finite, 130
 Fugue, 89

 Goodness, 74, 96, 101, 103
 Group mind, 57, 115

 Hobhouse, 55
 Holt, 28
 Hume, 26, 51, 109, 121
 Hypnotism, 91

 Illusion, 102
 Individualism, 115
 Internal sense, 18
 Introjection, 21, 51
 Introspection, 44
 Intuition, 3

 James, 16, 32 *n.*, 37
 Johnstone, 9 *n.*

 Kant, 109
 Knowledge, 27, 29, 75, 126

 Laird, 25, 81, 120, 122
 Language, 63, 70
 Leibniz, 134
 Life, 31 *n.*, 47
 Lloyd Morgan, 20, 24
 Locke, 47, 51, 54

 McDougall, 19 *n.*
 McTaggart, 120 *n.*, 125 *n.*, 127 *n.*,
 134 *n.*
 Mathematics, 13, 25, 111
 Matter, 98, 100
 Memory, 89, 91
 Mind, defined, 4, 13
 universal, 6, 135
 Moore, 106, 125
 Morton Prince, 89

 Negation, 71
 Nicholas de Cusa, 133 *n.*

 Object, 25 *n.*
 Ockham, 13, 14, 123
 Opposites, 104

138 THE CONTACT BETWEEN MINDS

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Particular, 5, 131 | Sleep, 91 |
| Passage, 93, 130 | Social psychology, 73 |
| Percipient event, 4 | Society, 64, 93, 115, 9., 122, 128 |
| Peter Lombard, 123 n. | Solipsism, 12 |
| Plato, 10, 26, 58, 108 | Spinoza, 58, 59, 123, 126 |
| Possible, 130 | State, 117 |
| Privative, 104 | Strong, 34, 87 |
| Properties, 8, 18 | Substance, 120 |
| Qualities, 18, 99, 124 | Trinity, 122 |
| Relation, 10, 125 | Truth, 74, 96, 101 |
| subsistent, 121 sq., 129 | Unity, 11 |
| Rivers, 89 | Universal, 5, 130 |
| Russell, 26 | Values, 74, 97 sq. |
| Scholastics, 46, 122 | Ward, 36 n. |
| Self, 16, 25 n., 51, 53, 56, 93, 122 | Whitehead, 9 n., 94, 133 n |
| Self-consciousness, 3, 32 | |
| Sense-data, 13, 25, 59, 98 | |

THE END

RECENT WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY

A Theory of Monads. Outlines of the Philosophy of the Principle of Relativity. By H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. 8vo. 15s. net.

"A fresh attempt to approach the problem of the ultimate nature of reality in a fashion as modern as it is fresh. . . . A very interesting treatise."
—VISCOUNT HALDANE in the *Saturday Review*.

"Full of suggestions of the greatest interest and value."—*The Spectator*.

The General Principle of Relativity in its Philosophical and Historical Aspect. By H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy in the University of London. Second Edition. With a new Chapter on "Einstein's Theory." Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

"Professor Wildon Carr has produced in this little volume a really valuable book. There was an hiatus in the current expositions of the principle of relativity. Its significance and importance had been clearly set forth in their bearing on mathematical physics. But the doctrine had not been connected with its position in the history of general philosophical thought. This Professor Carr has now done and with great knowledge of philosophy."—VISCOUNT HALDANE in a review of the first edition in *Nature*.

The New Idealism. By MAY SINCLAIR. 8vo. 14s. net.

"The book is one of the best defences of idealism that have appeared in recent years."—The Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL in *The Nation*.

"Miss Sinclair has an acute mind, and the battle is a spirited display."—*The Spectator*.

The Nature of "Intelligence" and the Principles of Cognition. By C. SPEARMAN, Ph.D., Grote Professor of Mind and Logic in the University of London. 8vo.

Knowledge and Truth. An Epistemological Essay. By LOUIS ARNAUD REID, M.A., Lecturer on Philosophy in University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. 8vo.

RECENT WORKS ON PHILOSOPHY

Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic.

Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A. (Oxon.)

Second Edition. Revised. 8vo. 21s. net.

"Benedetto Croce's *Aesthetic* in the original Italian consists of two parts, *Theory of Aesthetic* and *History of Aesthetic*. In the first edition of his translation Mr. Ainslie was able to give only a summary (containing about a third of the original matter) of the second part. In the present edition this is translated *in extenso*. Croce's historical survey of Aesthetic is executed in his usual masterly and comprehensive manner, and the quantity and importance of the new material make this new edition a valuable contribution to the English version of Croce's philosophy. Alterations and additions have also been made in the theoretical portion in conformity with the Italian fourth edition."—*The Spectator*.

A Faith that Enquires.

The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1920–21.

By Sir HENRY JONES, M.A., LL.D., D.Litt., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Glasgow. 8vo. 18s. net.

"The late Sir Henry Jones was a great teacher and a great preacher, and both qualities appear in this his last published utterance. No one who reads it but will be the better for it. . . . The book as a whole is a worthy monument of a beautiful and lovable soul, of a serious and original thinker who proved all things and held fast what he knew to be good."—*The Cambridge Review*.

The Theory of Mind as Pure Act.

By GIOVANNI GENTILE, Professor in the University of Rome.

Translated from the Third Edition, with an Introduction, by H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt. 8vo. 15s. net.

"The publication of Giovanni Gentile's *Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro*, in the remarkably clear English translation by Dr. Wildon Carr, has a peculiar significance for the student of contemporary Italian philosophy in its relation to the great idealistic movement which has spread over European thought. . . . The idealism of Gentile is a noble thing expressed in language of rare beauty and power."—*The Times Literary Supplement*.

LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.